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Abstract
Using Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico as case studies, this paper examines
how women’s collaboration influences the effects of gender quotas on women’s
representation. The efficacy of gender quotas in increasing the numerical representation
of women and improving gender equality outcomes is well-researched, but questions
remain about the precise linkages between the numerical representation of women and
the substantive representation of women. This thesis analyzes previously identified
linkages alongside actions by women’s organizations in national legislatures and civil
society to better understand women’s roles as critical actors in making gender quotas
successful. The findings suggest that women’s collaboration is crucial in achieving and
defining substantive representation, ensuring proper implementation of quotas, and
translating higher numerical representation into real gender equality outcomes.
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Chapter One
Gender Quotas and Women’s Representation in Latin America
Introduction

Eighty-two countries around the world currently implement mandated gender
quotas for their legislatures, yet the global average of female representation in national
legislatures is just 23 percent.1 Evidence suggests that it is often difficult for women to
reach parity in national legislatures without quotas. Currently, there are only five
countries in the world in which women comprise half of the total number of seats in the
legislature: Bolivia, Cuba, Mexico, Rwanda, and the United Arab Emirates.2 Of these
countries, only Cuba does not use an official gender quota.3 However, even among
countries with gender quotas only a select few have achieved parity in their legislatures.4
More troubling still is the lack of conclusive cross-country evidence that gender quotas,
even when effective in increasing numerical representation, lead to improved outcomes
for women – such as increased economic and educational opportunities, decreased
gender-based violence, and stronger civil rights.5 While significant scholarly attention has
been given to the processes and factors motivating the adoption of gender quotas and the

1

“Gender Quotas Database | International IDEA,” accessed September 15, 2020, https://www.idea.int/datatools/data/gender-quotas.
2
Sara Atske, A.W. Geiger, and Alissa Scheller, “The Share of Women in Legislatures around the World Is
Growing, but They Are Still Underrepresented,” Pew Research Center, accessed October 9, 2020,
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/03/18/the-share-of-women-in-legislatures-around-the-worldis-growing-but-they-are-still-underrepresented/.
3
“Gender Quotas Database | International IDEA.”
4
Ibid.
5
Mona Lena Krook, “Introduction to Gender Quotas,” in Quotas for Women in Politics: Gender and
Candidate Selection Reform Worldwide (Oxford University Press, 2010), 13.
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mechanisms influencing the success of quotas in raising the descriptive representation of
women, questions remain about the extent and causes of the substantive effects of gender
quotas.6
The under-representation of women in national legislatures is not confined to any
one region, culture, electoral system, or level of income and development,7 yet scholarly
explanations for the scarcity of female legislators vary from country to country.8
Similarly, gender equality outcomes vary significantly among countries at similar levels
of female representation in the legislature, suggesting that high descriptive representation
of women is not a sufficient cause of high substantive representation. This paper
examines the descriptive and substantive outcomes of gender quotas in four case studies
in order to analyze how critical mass theory applies to women’s representation in the
context of national legislated candidate gender quotas.
Before delving into this topic, it is necessary to clarify key terms and identify the existing
consensuses and contradictions in the literature.
Representation is referred to in this paper in two distinct ways. Descriptive
representation is used to refer to the number and proportion of women in legislatures.9
This is typically the simplest form of representation to assess in terms of outcomes,
although some scholars of descriptive representation have delved beyond the proportion
of women to also examine the different kinds of women represented. These works look at

6

Drude Dahlerup, “Gender Quotas – Controversial But Trendy,” International Feminist Journal of Politics
10, no. 3 (September 1, 2008): 326–28, https://doi.org/10.1080/14616740802185643.
7
“Gender Quotas Database | International IDEA.”
8
Pamela Marie Paxton, Melanie M. Hughes, and Tiffany Barnes, Women, Politics, and Power: A Global
Perspective (Rowman & Littlefield, 2020), 18-25.
9
Sarah Childs and Mona Lena Krook, “Analysing Women’s Substantive Representation: From Critical
Mass to Critical Actors,” Government and Opposition 44, no. 2 (2009): 127-8,
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2009.01279.x.
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the diversity of representation within groups of female legislators, for example their
family backgrounds, income levels, and races or ethnicities.10 Substantive representation
measures the impact of increased numbers of women in qualitative terms. In evaluating
this form of representation, both legislative processes and outcomes are considered.11 In
other words, substantive representation is a measure of the position and agency of women
within legislative bodies and their power and will to represent women’s interests.12
However, because of the complexity of this topic, scholars have taken varied approaches
to measuring substantive representation. Commonly used variables include representation
in committees and sub-committees, surveys on legislator attitudes, bill introduction,
authorship, and success, and voting records.13 While descriptive representation is the
most studied in the literature on gender quotas, substantive representation has been
thoroughly researched and debated, as well.14 These measures of representation are
interrelated, and scholars have worked to understand the interactions between them, but
findings on the impact of descriptive representation on substantive representation are
contradictory.15

10

Mala Htun, Inclusion without Representation in Latin America: Gender Quotas and Ethnic Reservations
(Cambridge University Press, 2016).
11
Susan Franceschet, “Gendered Institutions and Women’s Substantive Representation: Female Legislators
in Argentina and Chile,” in Gender, Politics and Institutions: Towards a Feminist Institutionalism, ed.
Mona Lena Krook and Fiona Mackay, Gender and Politics Series (London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan,
2011), 60, https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230303911_4.
12
Childs and Krook, “Analysing Women’s Substantive Representation: From Critical Mass to Critical
Actors,” 127-28.
13
Franceschet, “Gendered Institutions and Women’s Substantive Representation: Female Legislators in
Argentina and Chile,” 60.
14
Susan Franceschet, Mona Lena Krook, and Jennifer M. Piscopo, “Introduction,” in The Impact of Gender
Quotas (Oxford University Press, 2012), 7.
15
Childs and Krook, “Analysing Women’s Substantive Representation: From Critical Mass to Critical
Actors,” 143-5.
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It is also important to clarify what is meant by ‘women’s interests.’ Women are
not a monolithic body with a consistent set of interests that are distinct from men’s
interests. Women’s interests as a concept cannot cover the full range of the social,
economic, and political goals of female constituents or legislators.16 Further, women are
capable of genuinely desiring and pursuing policies that fall outside of Western feminist
orthodoxy.17 Borrowing from Piscopo’s work on substantive representation in Mexico,
this paper uses a ‘value-neutral’ approach in which ‘women’s interests’ refers to all
policies that deal with the rights and opportunities of women – education, healthcare,
child care, women’s rights, etc. – regardless of whether the policies are feminist.18
However, effort is made throughout the paper to distinguish between feminist and nonfeminist policies when relevant.
A gender quota is a policy, law, or constitutional amendment that mandates in
some fashion the gender proportion of people represented in a group.19 Quotas do not
always explicitly refer to the representation of women; some simply stipulate a minimum
requirement of some kind for the ‘under-represented sex.’20 In practice, however, these
quotas almost exclusively deal with the representation of women.21 This paper focuses
specifically on political gender quotas, meaning quotas that target political bodies. There
are three broad categories of political gender quotas: party quotas, reserved seat quotas,
and legislated candidate quotas.

16

Karen Celis et al., “Rethinking Women’s Substantive Representation,” Representation 44, no. 2 (July 1,
2008): 99-110, https://doi.org/10.1080/00344890802079573.
17
Celis et al., “Rethinking Women’s Substantive Representation,” 101-105.
18
Jennifer M. Piscopo, “Beyond Hearth and Home: Female Legislators, Feminist Policy Change, and
Substantive Representation in Mexico,” Revista Uruguaya de Ciencia Politica 23, no. 2 (2014): 93-94.
19
Krook, “Introduction to Gender Quotas,” 2.
20
Ibid.
21
Ibid.
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Party quotas are defined as voluntary gender quotas adopted by political parties
for the candidates they put forth.22 Party quotas are most popular in Europe and Africa,
but there is limited evidence of the efficacy of these quotas outside of Western Europe.23
Though findings are not conclusive, scholars suggest that political parties use voluntary
gender quotas as a way to appeal to female voters.24 Without enforcement mechanisms
and placement mandates, some parties relegate female candidates to the least electable
positions on candidates lists so little progress is actually made in terms of increasing
female representation, while parties accrue the benefits of appearing progressive.25
Reserved seat quotas, most common in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East,
typically work by setting aside a certain number of elected positions for women – only
female candidates are able to compete for these seats.26 Although these quotas have been
successful in some countries, there is also substantial evidence that in many places they
may limit the ability of women to compete for other seats by placing a ceiling, either
formally or informally, on the spots available to female candidates.27 They are also
heavily criticized for being non-democratic because they restrict who is able to run for
certain seats.

22

Franceschet, Krook, and Piscopo, “Introduction,” 15-24.
Leslie A. Schwindt-Bayer, “Making Quotas Work: The Effect of Gender Quota Laws On the Election of
Women,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 34, no. 1 (2009): 15-17, JSTOR.
24
Schwindt-Bayer, “Making Quotas Work: The Effect of Gender Quota Laws On the Election of Women,”
15-17.
25
Schwindt-Bayer, “Making Quotas Work: The Effect of Gender Quota Laws On the Election of Women,”
15-17.
26
Franceschet, Krook, and Piscopo, “Introduction,” 4-6.
27
Pamela Marie Paxton, Melanie M. Hughes, and Tiffany Barnes, “Explaining the Political Representation
of Women: Politics,” in Women, Politics, and Power: A Global Perspective (Rowman & Littlefield, 2020),
187-88.
23
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Legislated candidate quotas function similarly to party quotas in that they regulate
the proportion of each gender on party candidate lists. The key difference between these
two categories of quotas is that legislated quotas are not voluntary, rather they are
mandated through laws or constitutional amendments.28 Although legislated candidate
quotas are found in most regions of the world, they are particularly concentrated in Latin
America.29 In fact, nearly every country in Latin America utilizes a legislated gender
quota.30 This paper examines the effects of increased descriptive representation on the
substantive representation of women.

Research Question and Methodology

This paper will examine the question: To what extent and in what ways does
women’s collaboration influence the relationship between the descriptive and substantive
representation of women in the context of legislated candidate gender quotas? Answering
this question requires an evaluation of critical mass theory and its potential applications
in understanding how descriptive representation influences substantive representation, as
well as the role of institutionalist theories in explaining discrepancies in critical mass
theory. My hypothesis is that women’s collaboration is a critical intervening variable in
the relationship between descriptive and substantive representation. The independent
variable descriptive representation evaluates critical mass theory, while I introduce
women’s collaboration as the central intervening variable. Women’s collaboration as a

28

Franceschet, Krook, and Piscopo, “Introduction,” 8-9.
“Gender Quotas Database | International IDEA.”
30
Ibid.
29
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variable is defined as the organization and mobilization of women within and across the
legislature and civil society in support of women’s interests. It is measured in terms of the
presence, composition, and efforts of women’s coalitions, caucuses, and activism
networks in each case study. The dependent variable is substantive representation, which
is defined in the introduction. The hypothesis and variables are listed below.

Hypothesis: The collaboration of women between and across the legislature and
civil society is a critical variable in defining the relationship between descriptive and
substantive representation. Women’s collaboration leads to higher levels of substantive
representation.
Independent Variables: Descriptive representation
Dependent Variable: Substantive representation
Intervening Variable: Women’s collaboration

Four Latin American case studies are used in this paper. Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
and Mexico all introduced national legislated candidate gender quotas between 1991 and
2015.31 The case studies are concentrated in Latin America to provide some cultural
similarity, as this paper will not concentrate heavily on cultural factors that may affect
female representation. While there are certainly cultural differences between the case
studies, controlling for region provides a number of important similarities and reduces the
need to analyze factors such as religion and attitudes about gender roles and women.
Countries with varying degrees of success in gender quota implementation and varying
31

“Gender Quotas Database | International IDEA.”

7

representation and gender equality outcomes were selected intentionally to allow for
examination of the linkages between descriptive and substantive representation. Much of
the existing scholarship on gender quotas highlights the role of democratization in the
adoption, implementation, and efficacy of gender quotas; however, this will not be a main
focus of this paper, so it was important to select countries with similar histories of
authoritarianism. All of the case studies have experienced authoritarianism in the last 20
to 40 years and are now classified as democracies, although degrees of democratization
are varied.32 In choosing these case studies, effort was made to control for some features
of the electoral system, as well. Three of the four case studies are federal republics, Chile
is the exception.33 All of the countries use proportional representation systems in some
form, which the literature has identified as an important determinant of gender quota
success. Throughout the paper, care will be taken to identify important differences in the
structural, institutional, and cultural factors in each country when relevant to the analysis.
Since the introduction of gender quotas in these countries, gains in descriptive and
substantive representation have been highly varied.34 In 1991, the year Argentina passed
its first gender quota law, women represented just 5 percent of the Chamber of Deputies
(lower house) and 9 percent in the Senate (upper house).35 By 2019, women comprised

32

Freedom House, “Countries and Territories,” accessed October 11, 2020,
https://freedomhouse.org/countries/freedom-world/scores.
33
Leslie A. Schwindt-Bayer and Santiago Alles, “Women in Legislatures: Gender, Institutions, and
Democracy,” in Gender and Representation in Latin America, ed. Leslie A. Schwindt-Bayer (Oxford
University Press, 2018), 57.
34
Mala Htun, “Gender Quotas: Why and How,” in Inclusion without Representation in Latin America:
Gender Quotas and Ethnic Reservations (Cambridge University Press, 2016), 44-69.
35
Tiffany D. Barnes and Mark P. Jones, “Women’s Representation in the Argentine National and
Subnational Governments,” in Gender and Representation in Latin America, ed. Leslie A. Schwindt-Bayer
(Oxford University Press, 2018), 123-24.
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40 and 41 percent of the Argentine Senate and Chamber of Deputies, respectively.36
Similar increases in descriptive representation have occurred in Mexico, where gender
parity was achieved for both the Senate and Chamber in 2018.37 In Brazil and Chile,
however, descriptive representation has remained low. Women constitute 23 percent of
both the Senate and Chamber in Chile38 and roughly 14 percent of each in Brazil.39 If the
dominant theories about the effects of gender quotas and increased female representation,
which are elaborated on later in this chapter, are to be believed then we would expect to
see that the countries with the highest female representation and most successful quotas
are more equal than those with lower female representation.40 Later chapters examine the
level of substantive representation in each country.

Literature Review

While the locus of this paper will be examining substantive representation as an
outcome of legislated candidate quotas, it is necessary to discuss why and how gender
quotas are adopted. Aside from the intrinsic benefit to a democratic or semi-democratic
system of more equal representation for a group that comprises half of the population,41
proponents of gender quotas have collectively developed an robust framework
concerning the need for quotas and the reasons they are adopted. The primary theoretical

36

“Argentina,” Gender Quotas Database, International IDEA.
“Percentage of Women in National Parliaments.” Inter-Parliamentary Union (January 2019).
38
“Chile,” Gender Quotas Database, International IDEA.
39
“Brazil,” Gender Quotas Database, International IDEA.
40
Mona Lena Krook, “Candidate Gender Quotas: A Framework for Analysis,” European Journal of
Political Research 46, no. 3 (2007): 371-72, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2007.00704.x.
41
Miki Caul Kittilson and Leslie A. Schwindt-Bayer, The Gendered Effects of Electoral Institutions:
Political Engagement and Participation (Oxford University Press, 2012), 10-15.
37
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underpinning of this framework is that in most countries, without quotas it is exceedingly
difficult for female legislators to be elected to enough seats to effectively represent
women’s interests.42
Critical mass theory, as this argument is termed, observes that the mere presence
of women in a male-dominated sphere is not enough to ensure a change in the dynamics
or functions of that sphere. Studies have found that the proportion of women to men is
actually the predictor of such shifts. When the ratio of women to men is heavily skewed,
female members of the group are tokenized and their personal agency reduced.43 Kanter
categorized the three main results of these skewed sex ratios on the agency and choices of
women as performance pressures, isolation, and role entrapment.44 While performance
pressures typically affect the visibility of women, isolation may force women to choose
between remaining ‘others’ or becoming part of in-group by adopting the role of
“woman-prejudiced-against-women.”45 Role entrapment limits the ability of women to
move beyond traditional stereotypes, for example the “mother, the seductress, the pet or
the iron maiden.”46 She argues that these dynamics are self-perpetuating; as women are
tokenized it becomes more difficult to organically increase the proportion of women.47
Building on Kanter’s work, scholars identified the ‘critical mass’ needed for women to
42

Atske, Geiger, and Scheller, “The Share of Women in Legislatures around the World Is Growing, but
They Are Still Underrepresented.”
43
Rosabeth Moss Kanter, “Some Effects of Proportions on Group Life: Skewed Sex Ratios and Responses
to Token Women,” American Journal of Sociology 82, no. 5 (1977): 966, JSTOR. Drude Dahlerup, “From
a Small to a Large Minority: Women in Scandinavian Politics,” Scandinavian Political Studies 11, no. 4
(1988): 280, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9477.1988.tb00372.x.
44
Kanter, “Some Effects of Proportions on Group Life: Skewed Sex Ratios and Responses to Token
Women,” 966.
45
Sarah Childs and Mona Lena Krook, “Critical Mass Theory and Women’s Political Representation,”
Political Studies 56, no. 3 (October 1, 2008): 727, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2007.00712.x.
46
Childs and Krook, “Critical Mass Theory and Women’s Political Representation,” 727.
47
Kanter, “Some Effects of Proportions on Group Life: Skewed Sex Ratios and Responses to Token
Women,” 988.
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effectively form a ‘counterculture,’ forge alliances, and achieve agency – in other words,
substantive representation – as 30 percent.48
Scholars have also advanced a number of theories to supplement and support the
critical mass argument. Prominent among these theories is the ‘role model effect,’
whereby reaching a critical mass within the legislature engenders cultural shifts that
empower women to pursue office in other branches of government, enable party
members to achieve leadership positions, and encourage women to build political
recruitment networks that increase the descriptive representation of women across
institutions and beyond minimum quotas.49 However, findings on the role model effect
are mixed, especially in studies of Latin America.50 A common explanation for cases
which offer no support for the role model effect is clientelism in party recruitment
networks, which disadvantages women and prevents them from achieving positions
beyond the gender quota.51 While some scholars assert that informal recruitment and
candidate nomination processes benefit female candidates,52 the clientelist networks that
usually exist in such environments marginalize women once they take office and restrict
their ability to act beyond the orders of party leaders.53

48

Dahlerup, “From a Small to a Large Minority: Women in Scandinavian Politics,” 280.
Yann Kerevel, “Empowering Women? Gender Quotas and Women’s Political Careers,” The Journal of
Politics 81, no. 4 (July 18, 2019): 1168, https://doi.org/10.1086/704434.
50
Ibid.
51
Rainbow Murray and Réjane Sénac, “Explaining Gender Gaps in Legislative Committees,” Journal of
Women, Politics & Policy 39, no. 3 (July 3, 2018): 310–35,
https://doi.org/10.1080/1554477X.2018.1477397.
52
Jennifer M. Piscopo, “When Informality Advantages Women: Quota Networks, Electoral Rules and
Candidate Selection in Mexico,” Government and Opposition 51, no. 3 (July 2016): 506-07,
https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2016.11.
53
Piscopo, “Beyond Hearth and Home: Female Legislators, Feminist Policy Change, and Substantive
Representation in Mexico,” 96-7.
49
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This perspective is one of the most popular from a broader category of
scholarship on gender quotas that uses institutionalist theories to address the limitations
of critical mass theory.54 Institutionalist analyses of gender quotas address how formal
and informal norms in political bodies and parties affect descriptive and substantive
representation. Frequently, these theories are used to explain cases in which increased
descriptive representation does not lead to higher substantive representation.55 Political
clientelism among parties is a prominent example of such theories. Although
institutionalist theories are sometimes used to refute critical mass, they are more often
used to explain how distortions can occur without challenging the overall logic of critical
mass theory.56 Other institutionalist theories examine how aspects of the electoral system
interact with gender quotas to benefit or disadvantage female candidates. Research on
district magnitude, proportional representation, and candidate lists falls into this category
of scholarship.
While critical mass theory is widely used, there are a number of gender and
politics scholars that have presented contradictory findings, and some have denounced
the theory entirely.57 Studies of gender quotas in particular have focused on when and
why critical mass fails to produce substantive representation; however, these explanations
typically focus on single or small numbers of case studies and existing literature has
failed to identify a consistent cross-national theory.58 Further, even when examining the

54

Fiona Mackay, Meryl Kenny, and Louise Chappell, “New Institutionalism Through a Gender Lens:
Towards a Feminist Institutionalism?,” International Political Science Review 31, no. 5 (November 1,
2010): 573-588, https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512110388788.
55
Ibid.
56
Ibid.
57
Childs and Krook, “Critical Mass Theory and Women’s Political Representation,” 727.
58
Franceschet, Krook, and Piscopo, “Introduction,” 7.
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same case studies, scholars emphasize different contributing factors. Some literature
focuses on the motivations of gender quota proponents and how quotas come to be
adopted as explanations for disparities in descriptive and substantive representation.
Critical analyses argue that gender quotas are passed through predominately male
legislatures because male politicians either design the quotas to be ineffective or use the
quota system to install female legislators with little political agency59 or who will
promote their party’s agenda.60 Of course, there are numerous other critiques of gender
quotas, primarily relating to principles of fairness, specific conceptions of democratic
election, and the availability of qualified potential female legislators, but these issues will
be addressed later in the paper.61
As a result of critical scrutiny on the reasoning behind male legislators passing quotas
laws, scholars have dedicated extensive research to the groups and motivations that
engender quota laws.62
Four narratives emerge from the literature on this topic. First, women mobilize in
support of increased representation, using existing women’s organization or forming new
ones to advocate for the introduction of gender quotas.63 This occurs internally in
political institutions and externally as public movements.64 Scholars argue that pressure

59

Mackay, Kenny, and Chappell, “New Institutionalism Through a Gender Lens: Towards a Feminist
Institutionalism?,” 583.
60
Krook, “Introduction to Gender Quotas,” 9-11.
61
Tricia Gray, “Electoral Gender Quotas: Lessons from Argentina and Chile,” Bulletin of Latin American
Research 22, no. 1 (2003): 52-78, JSTOR.
62
Dahlerup, “Gender Quotas – Controversial But Trendy,” 327.
63
Kathleen Bruhn, “Whores and Lesbians: Political Activism, Party Strategies, and Gender Quotas in
Mexico,” Electoral Studies 22, no. 1 (March 1, 2003): 101–19, https://doi.org/10.1016/S02613794(01)00039-7.
64
Bruhn, “Whores and Lesbians: Political Activism, Party Strategies, and Gender Quotas in Mexico,” 10711.
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from female party members and public mobilization is often, although not always, an
important factor in passing quota laws and in ensuring that parties enforce these laws
when enforcement mechanisms are weak.65 In contradiction to critiques that emphasize
the self-serving role of male-dominated parties and male legislators, this narrative
identifies women as key actors in quota law adoption.66
Second, political parties adopt internal quotas or advocate for legislated candidate
quotas for competitive reasons.67 When a rival political party adopts a gender quota,
others may follow in a contagion effect as they fear losing out to their opposition.68
Similarly, parties may choose a quota during periods of declining support or in the face of
increasing opposition.69 Most works promoting this explanation argue that male party
leaders and legislators adopt gender quotas to attract female constituents and gain a
competitive edge over predominately male competitors.70 This narrative, in which the
role of women is diminished, is frequently used to explain cases where quotas fail to
reach the target level of descriptive representation.71
Third, governments and political parties may introduce quota laws because they
are consistent with existing dominant views on equality and representation.72 Examples

65

Ibid.
Karen Celis, Mona Lena Krook, and Petra Meier, “The Rise of Gender Quota Laws: Expanding the
Spectrum of Determinants for Electoral Reform,” West European Politics 34, no. 3 (May 1, 2011): 521,
https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2011.555981.
67
Miki Caul, “Political Parties and the Adoption of Candidate Gender Quotas: A Cross–National
Analysis,” Journal of Politics 63, no. 4 (2001): 1216, https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-3816.00107.
68
Ibid.
69
Ibid.
70
Caul, “Political Parties and the Adoption of Candidate Gender Quotas: A Cross–National Analysis,”
1216.
71
Lisa Baldez, “Elected Bodies: The Gender Quota Law for Legislative Candidates in Mexico,” Legislative
Studies Quarterly 29, no. 2 (2004): 235. JSTOR.
72
Katharina Inhetveen, “Can Gender Equality Be Institutionalized?: The Role of Launching Values in
Institutional Innovation,” International Sociology 14, no. 4 (December 1, 1999): 420-22,
https://doi.org/10.1177/0268580999014004002.
66

14

of this are countries in which gender quotas have been adopted after or in conjunction
with quotas for other marginalized groups, such as in Iraq and Jordan where quotas exist
for both women and religious minorities.73 Political parties may also support gender
quotas because they align with party ideology.74 Scholarly works advocating this theory
suggest that not only are Leftist parties more likely to introduce quota laws, but that
quotas are more effective when implemented under a Left-dominated government.75
However, supporting evidence for this theory is case-specific and has not been confirmed
by cross-national trends.76
Fourth, international factors motivate governments and political parties to
implement gender quotas. This may be due to norm dispersal; many scholars indicate that
the 1995 United Nations World Conference on Women helped shape international
perceptions of the importance of female representation in government.77 Others point to
regional trends where gender quotas may have spread through a contagion effect across
national borders.78 Latin America in particular is often used as an example of this. 79 In
another vein of this literature, scholars suggest that gender quotas are introduced to gain

73

Assaf David and Stefanie Nanes, “The Women’s Quota in Jordan’s Municipal Councils: International
and Domestic Dimensions,” Journal of Women, Politics & Policy 32, no. 4 (October 1, 2011): 278-85,
https://doi.org/10.1080/1554477X.2011.613709.
74
Miki Caul, “Women’s Representation in Parliament: The Role of Political Parties,” Party Politics 5, no.
1 (January 1, 1999): 81-82, https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068899005001005.
75
Ibid.
76
Kendall D. Funk, Magda Hinojosa, and Jennifer M. Piscopo, “Still Left Behind: Gender, Political Parties,
and Latin America’s Pink Tide,” Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State & Society 24, no. 4
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legitimacy in the international arena, to appeal to organizations such as the United
Nations and the World Bank, or to deflect criticism about human rights abuses.80
These four narratives on why and how gender quotas are passed demonstrate the
diversity of the existing literature. Most case studies acknowledge that all four factors are
usually present to some extent, but typically identify one dominate narrative. While
causal links are difficult to identify, this brief analysis of the actors and motivations
involved in adopting gender quotas provides important context that is useful in
understanding country-specific variations in the success of gender quotas in increasing
the descriptive, substantive, and symbolic representation of women.81
While consensus on many aspects of gender quotas has been difficult to reach for
academics, there are some qualities of descriptive representation on which the majority of
the literature is in agreement. These areas of agreement have been formulated in large
part as a response to critics of gender quotas who argue that quotas artificially increase
the representation of women by bringing to power female legislators who are unqualified
for office. This argument stems from a belief that the recruitment pool of women with the
appropriate education and experience for legislative office is simply too small, and that
efforts to increase the representation of women should focus on education, training, and
mentorship. While such measures are certainly important, gender quota scholarship has
largely debunked the assertion that women are underrepresented because they are under
qualified.
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In her seminal book on women’s political representation in Latin America,
Hinjosa puts forth an argument that integrates three strains of factors used by scholars to
explain cross-national variations in the efficacy of gender quotas.82 This framework falls
under the category of institutionalist theories used in this paper. The three strains Hinjosa
uses are referred to as ‘supply side,’ ‘demand side,’ and institutional factors.83 Supply
side explanations argue that the pool of eligible female candidates is too restricted and
that female representation is limited by the supply of women candidates even when
gender quotas are in use.84 These explanations use variables such as maternal health,
educational attainment, labor force participation, and civic participation as support.85
Demand side analyses examine the preferences and biases of voters and citizens,
including cultural beliefs about gender equality and the leadership capacity of women, as
the primary barrier to increased female representation.86 Institutional explanations look at
the regulations and procedures of the institutions involved in the election process, such as
electoral rules and arrangements and candidate selection procedures of political parties.87
Hinjosa integrates these three strains of explanations by breaking down the path to
office into five distinct phases: Population, Eligible, Aspirant, Candidate, Officeholder.88
Building on previous work in this field, she uses data on variables such as educational
attainment, work force participation, fertility, wages, and political participation to show
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that there are indeed enough qualified women in most Latin American countries to fulfill
candidate quotas.89 She further demonstrates that while citizen and voter bias against
female political candidates do exist, it is limited and cannot fully explain the
underrepresentation of women in much of Latin America.90 These conclusions are
supported by other leading scholars in the literature.91
Thus, she argues that the primary challenges for women in transitioning from
Population to Officeholder are not explained by supply side variables in the shift from
Population to Eligible, nor by demand side factors in the move from Candidate to Office
Holder.92 Instead, a potent combination of all three explanatory strains restricts women’s
advancement from Eligible to Aspirant and Candidate.93 While this terminology is unique
to Hinjosa’s work and those citing her, it accurately captures the general conclusions
from the literature. Despite many contradictions and points of contention on the
importance of specific mechanisms hindering descriptive representation, scholars of
gender quotas generally agree that other than quota law design and implementation, the
most salient and intractable barriers are institutional and manifest during political
recruitment and candidate selection processes.94
In focusing her analysis on the transition from Eligible to Aspirant and Candidate,
Hinjosa develops a sequenced framework that includes elements of each explanatory
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strain. Per this framework, women face self-selective supply side issues in reaching the
level of aspirant.95 Hinjosa finds that female Eligibles are less likely than their male
counterparts with similar qualifications and levels of political interest to believe that they
are qualified and less likely to self-nominate.96 According to Hinjosa, and numerous
studies conducted in the United States that she cites, being asked or encouraged to run for
office is critical in this transition to Aspirant for men and women, but that women are
both less likely to receive this encouragement and less likely to self-nominate without
it.97 Once becoming Aspirants, women face institutional challenges generated by the
candidate selection processes of political parties.98 Scholars of Latin American gender
quotas disagree on some of the finer points of how these selection processes impact
women – the benefits of formal versus informal systems, for example, are hotly debated –
but most agree that the prevalence of clientelism within political parties puts female
Aspirants at a significant disadvantage.99 Finally, as candidates women may face demand
side issues. When quota laws are poorly designed, party leaders may relegate female
candidates to less electable positions on the bottom of candidate lists because they
believe them to be less appealing to voters or, again, as a function of political
clientelism.100 Hinjosa’s framework, crucial in highlighting that female
underrepresentation and the varied successes of quota laws cannot be fully explained by
either voter preferences or the qualifications of women, will be used throughout the paper
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to evaluate institutionalist perspectives on how gender quotas have affected the different
stages of the path to office for women in the four case studies.

Findings

To what extent and in what ways does women’s collaboration influence the
relationship between the descriptive and substantive representation of women in the
context of legislated candidate gender quotas? The findings of this paper support the
hypothesis that the collaboration of women between and across the legislature and civil
society is a critical and overlooked variable in defining the relationship between
descriptive and substantive representation. Critical mass and institutional theories do, to a
large extent, explain the relationship between gender quotas, descriptive representation,
and substantive representation. However, the majority of these theories use descriptive
representation as a ‘middle man’ between gender quotas and substantive representation.
In doing so, they miss key mechanisms affecting substantive representation in the case
studies.
The correlation between the descriptive and substantive representation of women
is significant, and is, at least partially, justified through critical mass theory. Institutional
explanations go far in addressing how formal and informal norms in bodies such as
political parties create varying results in the leap from critical mass to substantive
representation. Electoral perspectives have reached thorough consensus on the effect of
gender quota design and implementation on descriptive representation. In these ways,
many of the pieces of the puzzle of gender quotas have already been assembled, but key
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gaps remain in connecting the three images – gender quotas, descriptive representation,
and substantive representation – to form one cohesive picture. Specifically, mainstream
research on critical mass theory and institutional explanations both fail to adequately
address the linkage between gender quotas and substantive representation in a way that is
distinct from the linkage between descriptive and substantive representation.
The main point of critical mass theory, that once women reach approximately 30
percent of an organization they will be able to overcome bias, tokenization, role
entrapment and other issues to substantively represent women is over-simplified.101
Institutional explanations of gender and representation have worked to fill some the gaps
in this theory by highlighting the mitigating role of predominately formal institutions,
such as political parties and specific features of the electoral system, in the relationship
between descriptive and substantive representation.102 The primary finding of this paper
is that women’s collaboration plays a critical role not only in the adoption and
implementation of gender quotas, but also in the formation of effective tools and
organizations for female legislators to enact substantive representation. Evaluation of
both descriptive and substantive representation in the case studies found that
collaboration between female legislators and women’s non-governmental organizations
allowed for more effective articulation of demands both before and after quotas and
influenced the dynamics of women within the legislature. The research found that
activism networks combining women in civil society with women in the legislature that
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were founded during the gender quota movement and persisted afterwards were
associated with higher substantive representation. Thus, women’s collaboration emerged
as a significant independent variable. Indeed, when women’s collaboration was added to
the analysis, the discrepancies between actual levels of substantive representation and
expected substantive representation, based on descriptive representation and according to
critical mass theory, were better explained. These discrepancies are visualized in Graph
1.

Graph 1: Relationship Between Descriptive and Substantive Representation

Graph 1 displays the relationship between descriptive and substantive
representation in each of the case studies as posited in this paper. On the x-axis,

22

descriptive representation is shown as the percentage of women in the legislature.103 On
the y-axis are original estimates of substantive representation shown as quantitative
approximates on a scale from 0 to 1. Substantive representation is measured for each case
study in Chapters Four and Five using the methods outlined in the introduction. The blue
line is a rough illustration of the relationship predicted between descriptive and
substantive representation by critical mass theory. This theory is wholly qualitative, so
the line shown in Graph 1 is an original attempt at translating the principles of critical
mass theory into a visual. The data points show the real descriptive representation and
estimated substantive representation of each case study. The graph shows the
discrepancies between substantive representation in each case study and the substantive
representation suggested by critical mass theory.
Argentina and Mexico were found to have lower substantive representation than
critical mass theory would suggest and Brazil and Chile were found to have higher
substantive representation than predicted. These conclusions are reached and explained in
Chapters Four and Five. The independent variable women’s collaboration helps explain
these discrepancies. In Mexico and Argentina, women’s collaboration was a key driver of
substantive representation despite barriers presented by institutional features of the
political system.104 Mexico saw less feminist substantive representation and more
women’s interest representation due to the consensus norms within women’s
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organizations.105 In Argentina, the reverse was true.106 In Brazil107 and Chile,108 women
within the legislature were not the primary sources of substantive representation;
however networks between some female legislators and non-governmental organizations
helped maintain a level of substantive representation that was overall higher than
expected by critical mass theory.
The nature of women’s coalitions and networks clearly influenced the dynamics
of women’s collaboration in the legislature. Consensus among female legislators emerged
as a priority in countries where gender quota coalitions were cross-party among
legislators and cross-section among civil society members. In countries where consensus
is not a main priority, gender quota adoption was either not precipitated by widespread
activism, or the supporting coalitions were not cross-party and cross-sectional. The effect
of consensus versus non-consensus style collaboration of female legislators is nonmonotonic on the overall level of substantive representation. However, the outcomes of
substantive representation vary according to the prioritization of consensus. In
legislatures where the expectation among female legislators is that they should all agree
on a women’s interest bill before proposing it, women’s interests can be well represented
but feminist interests typically cannot. The opposite effect is observed in legislatures in
which consensus is not prioritized. In these legislatures, women are more successful in
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representing feminist interests and less successful in broader forms of women’s interests,
such as gender mainstreaming. These results are summarized in Graphs 2 and 3 below.

Graph 2: Relationship Between Women’s Collaboration and Substantive
Representation

Graph 2 shows the relationship between women’s collaboration on the x axis and
substantive representation on the y axis. Both variables are qualitative, but have been
assigned numerical values on scales from 0 to 1 for the purpose of visualizing their
relationship. Values closer to 1 indicate higher levels of each variable. This graph
demonstrates that Mexico and Argentina have similar levels of substantive representation
and are rated highly on the degree of women’s collaboration, despite the difference in
their levels of descriptive representation. Women in Brazil and Chile display similar
levels of collaboration that correspond with their substantive representation.
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Graph 3: Relationship Between Collaboration, Consensus, and Substantive
Representation

Graph 3 shows the relationship between women’s collaboration and the primacy
of consensus norms among women’s organizations. Collaboration and consensus norms
are both qualitative variables that are shown in the graph on a scale from 0 to 1. On the y
axis, values closer to 1 indicate that consensus norms are highly observed in the relevant
women’s organization, while scores closer to 0 indicate the opposite. The degree and type
of substantive representation in each case study is indicated by the size and color of the
country’s point on the graph to show how these variables interact. Larger points show
higher substantive representation. Bright colors show that substantive representation
includes feminist interests, while grey-scale colors indicate that substantive
representation is mainly for broader women’s interests. The graph reiterates that higher
substantive representation is associated with higher women’s collaboration. However,
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this graph also demonstrates the non-monotonic effect of consensus versus nonconsensus norms within arenas of women’s collaboration on substantive representation.
The primacy of consensus norms does not affect the overall level of substantive
representation, but it does affect whether the representation generally includes feminist
interests.
This explanation bridges some of the gap in understanding the relationships
between gender quotas, descriptive representation, and substantive representation.
Current research tends to focus on either the link between quotas and descriptive
representation or between descriptive and substantive representation. Yet, by refocusing
the analysis on the role of informal coalitions and non-governmental institutions in
establishing the dynamics and norms of women’s collaboration within the legislature, it is
possible to see how the events surrounding the adoption of gender quotas ultimately
influence substantive representation, sometimes even decades later. Understanding and
investigating this link allows for better explanation of the varying levels and forms of
substantive representation at each degree of descriptive representation. In other words,
the connection directly between gender quota formation and substantive representation
helps to explain why some countries with low descriptive representation experience high
substantive representation and why substantive representation leads to feminist outcomes
in some countries and not in others. This does not refute critical mass or institutionalist
theories, but rather adds a layer of analysis that may prove useful in further development
of gender quota research.
This paper evaluates the research question in four subsequent chapters. Rather
than dedicating a chapter to each case study, chapters are divided according to descriptive
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and substantive representation with the high and low performing countries in each form
of representation grouped in separate chapters. This first chapter has introduced the
research question, case studies, and main findings while providing an overview of the
relevant literature. The second and third chapters will examine descriptive representation
in the case studies with a focus on the mechanisms promoting or hindering effective
gender quota implementation and how these might affect substantive representation. The
fourth and fifth chapters will analyze women’s substantive representation. Each of these
two chapters will investigate whether female legislators prioritize women’s interests and
their capacity to do so effectively. Following chapter five, the conclusion will revisit the
central arguments from these chapters and discuss the role of this paper in the broader
field of research.
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Chapter Two
Reaching Critical Mass in Mexico and Argentina

This chapter examines descriptive representation in Argentina and Mexico.
Beginning with an analysis of the quota laws and their implementation, this chapter
explores the institutional factors and actors contributing to and preventing increased
representation of women. By comparing case studies in which quota laws have been
effective descriptively, this chapter will identify important cross-national and contextual
variables in order to analyze their role in substantive representation in later chapters.
Chapter Three will use the same approach to study descriptive representation in the two
less successful cases: Brazil and Chile. Dividing those case studies that have been more
effective in increasing descriptive representation from those that have had less success
will allow for a thorough investigation of the links between descriptive and substantive
representation, as well as identification of potential links between gender quotas and
substantive representation.

Mexico

Between 1990 and 2018, the percentage of women in the Mexican legislature
increased from 12 percent to 49 percent.109 The achievement of gender parity in Mexico
is due in large part to the use of legislated candidate quotas, but the path from the first
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gender quota of 1996 to parity in 2018 is long, convoluted, and as riddled with failures as
it is with successes. Understanding the challenges that advocates faced in passing
effective gender quotas sheds light on the institutional features and actors that influence
women’s descriptive and substantive representation, not just in Mexico but throughout
Latin America.
First, some context on the political landscape and electoral features of Mexico is
necessary. Mexico is a federal republic comprised of 31 states and Mexico City, which is
no longer a Federal District but does elect its own federal representatives.110 Much like
the United States, the government has three independent branches: the executive
(President and appointed cabinet), the bicameral legislature (the Chamber of Deputies
and the Senate), and the judiciary (the Supreme Court of Justice).111 Until 2014, no
elected federal officials could be reelected.112 A 2014 Constitutional amendment allowed
federal legislators to run for immediate reelection, but the Presidential term limit is one
six year term.113 The lower house, the Chamber of Deputies, has three year terms. It uses
a mixed electoral system of 300 Single Member District seats (SMD) and 200
Proportional Representation (PR) seats.114 Senators, of which there are 128, have six year
terms.115 Senate seats are assigned to parties through proportional representation; 32 seats
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are based on the national vote and 96 are based on individual state votes.116 SMD
legislators are elected by plurality vote from districts in 31 states and Mexico City, while
PR seats are allocated to political parties according to their percentage of the national
vote117. Mexico has a high district magnitude for its PR seats. There are five districts for
the Chamber of Deputies PR seats, each consisting of 40 seats. PR legislators are elected
from closed and rank-ordered candidate lists, meaning that voters have no influence over
which candidates are elected from the list when they vote for a given party.118
These features of the electoral system are important, as scholarship on the
political representation of women has found consistent links between PR systems and
higher proportions of female legislators and effectiveness of gender quotas.119 This is
because PR systems shift the incentives for parties in candidate selection.120 The ‘winner
takes all’ procedure of SMD systems in which only one candidate is elected from each
electoral district incentivizes parties to advance the candidates they believe are the most
competitive and will have the broadest appeal to voters.121 In many cases, the dominant
view is that male candidates are more likely to succeed, so party leaders field more male
candidates in SMD systems. In PR systems, where seats are allocated according to the
party’s national performance, party leaders are incentivized to put forward a variety of
candidates with appeal to different social groups because multiple candidates can be
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elected from each electoral district.122 Thus, women are at a disadvantage in SMD
systems because of real or perceived voter biases, but are sometimes desired candidates
in PR systems when party leaders believe that female candidates are more popular with
female or left-leaning voters.123 District magnitude is also associated with the
representation of women.124 Female candidates typically fare better in systems with high
district magnitude, although this effect is more pronounced in PR systems than in
majoritarian systems.125
Although the use of SMD for the majoritarian seats in Mexico should create
challenges for female candidates, the high district magnitude for Mexico’s PR seats (40
members) should provide opportunities for potential female legislators. It is, however,
important to note that the use of closed PR systems gives party leaders an incredible
amount of influence over which candidates are elected and which are not.126 Even when
candidate nomination and selection processes are transparent and unbiased, party leaders
are often able to decide the ranking of candidates on PR lists.127 Rank-ordered, closed PR
lists allow a number of the top-ranked candidates to be elected. This number of
candidates is based on the number or proportion of votes the party receives, but
regardless the top positions on the PR lists are the most likely candidates to be elected.128
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For this reason, it is important to understand the ideologies, dynamics, and candidate
selection processes of the main political parties in each case study.
Mexico had three main political parties until the success of President Lopez
Obrador and his center-left party National Regeneration Movement (MORENA) in 2018
added a fourth party to this list.129 These three parties are the Institutional Party of the
Revolution (PRI), the National Action Party (PAN), and the Party of the Democratic
Revolution (PRD).130 Mexico was led by an authoritarian, one-party regime under PRI
from the Mexican Revolution until the turn of the century.131 Democratization began in
the late 1980s and was consolidated with the election of President Vicente Fox of PAN in
2000.132 The PRI is typically characterized as a pro-business center-right party, while
PAN is a conservative party and the PRD is leftist. In all three parties, the selection of
political candidates is tightly controlled by party leaders.133 Although the PAN and the
PRD use primaries for nominations, party leaders are able to heavily influence the
outcomes of primaries through political clientelism and strategic selection of party
members to attend the national conventions where primaries are held.134 The PRI has
made efforts to ostensibly democratize their candidate selection in recent years, but until
the early 2000s the party relied entirely on informal decision-making to select and
nominate candidates. 135
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The use of informal decision-making versus primaries for party candidate
selection is a point of contention in the debate on female representation. When gender
quotas are not in use, both can be detrimental to the electoral prospects of female
candidates. Substantial research has shown that female candidates typically have less
funding and name recognition than their male counterparts.136 Even in the absence of low
or moderate voter gender biases, these factors can make primaries more challenging for
women without measures to correct for the historic economic and political disadvantages
faced by women.137 Alternatively, without quotas, informal decision-making can enable
male-dominated party leadership to operate clientelist recruitment networks and selection
procedures that primarily benefit male candidates who are connected to party leaders
through business or family ties.138 Scholars disagree on which of these mechanisms is
more disadvantageous for female candidates, but both present substantial barriers for
women hoping to achieve political office.139 However, when gender quotas are in use, or
when they are being debated, primaries often prove more damaging to the prospects of
female candidates. Not only is the use of primaries often a point which critics use to
oppose the introduction of gender quotas, but also a procedure through which poorly
designed quotas can fail to increase female representation.140 With this institutional
context in mind, the analysis turns to the adoption, features, and implementation of the
gender quota.
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Like many other countries where legislated candidate quotas are in use, the
movement towards gender quotas in Mexico began with voluntary party quotas. In 1990,
the PRD implemented a small quota for female representation in party leadership,
believing that a candidate quota would be incompatible with the party’s use of
primaries.141 However, in the election that followed the PRD fielded the fewest female
candidates of any other party in Mexico, showing again that weak quotas can be
ineffectual and even counterproductive.142 As discussed in Chapter One, the introduction
of a gender quota can often cause a contagion effect among parties as they compete for
new or changing constituencies.143 Per this theory, in 1993 the PRI adopted a rule that at
least 30 percent of its candidates should be of a different gender than the other 70
percent.144 Just one year later, the PRI selected a woman as party president, reflecting
either shifting attitudes about gender within the party or a concentrated effort to make the
party more competitive as the pace of democratization increased and PRI’s stronghold on
the country weakened. Prioritizing party ideology, the conservative PAN resisted
implementing a gender quota and argued that a quota would compromise the integrity of
its purportedly democratic candidate selection process.145
In response to the new public attention on female representation and failure of
voluntary quotas to increase the proportion of women in the legislature – by 1997 just 14
percent of federal legislators were women – female party militants and legislators began
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to form cross-party coalitions to advocate for a legislated candidate gender quota law.146
Organizing across party lines, in the late 1990s female party members and legislators
created formal and informal networks in conjunction with women’s civil society groups
to advocate their position.147 Their initial efforts produced a 1996 national gender quota
law that recommended that each party ensure that no more than 70 percent of a party’s
candidates be of a single gender.148 The law was non-binding, carried no enforcement or
oversight mechanisms, and fell far short of the demands of the women’s groups pushing
for increased political representation. In fact, from 1996 to 2000 (before a new quota was
passed) the proportion of women in the legislature actually decreased slightly.149 While
the PRI and PRD complied with the letter of the law by fielding close to 30 percent
female candidates, they did so by nominating women to suplente spots.150 In Mexico, two
candidates are nominated for each seat of a party’s ticket; one as a proprietario (primary)
and one as a suplente (alternate).151 The suplente only ever takes office if the elected
proprietario resigns, dies, or is otherwise unable to complete their term.152 When parties
fulfilled the quota by placing female candidates as suplentes, they guaranteed that almost
none of those women would actually hold office.153 This background demonstrates that
women played a significant role in the movement for gender quotas in Mexico, although
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party politics and competition were are important factors. Further, it is clear that quota
laws can be rendered largely ineffective not just in the absence of enforcement and
oversight, but also due to exploitable loopholes in the electoral system.
In 1997, women’s coalitions were successful in establishing the bicameral
Commission on Gender Equality (CIG) in the legislature, the primary institutional vehicle
for the introduction and eventual adoption of gender quotas and numerous women’s
interest laws.154 Through continued mobilization and as a result of the institutionalization
of gender issues in the legislature through the CIG, the first mandatory gender quota law
was passed in 2002.155 However, this law was only possible after a ruling by the Supreme
Court upholding a 2001 gender quota passed in the state of Coahuila.156 Coahuila’s quota
placed a 70 percent limit on the gender proportions of candidate lists for state congress.157
PAN challenged the law on the grounds that the law disadvantaged male candidates, thus
violating existing Constitutional protections for gender equality.158 The court ruled that
the quota was indeed in line with the Constitution, but added that parties that used
primaries for candidate selection would be exempt.159
Through the CIG, quota proponents introduced a law closely resembling
Coahuila’s. With confirmation that a national gender quota would be Constitutional, and
in the face of mounting pressure from cross-party and civil society coalitions, the
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legislature passed the law nearly unanimously. However, although the 2002 law was
considerably stronger than the 1996 quota – in particular, parties were required to place
women in electable positions on PR lists and could no longer nominate women as
suplentes to fill the quota – parties continued to find ways to circumvent the law. As a
result, female representation in the legislature increased 7 percent in the first election
after the law was passed, but remained below the 30 percent believed to be necessary for
critical mass, let alone parity, until a series of amendments between 2008 and 2011
improved the law.
Although the 2002 quota law was mandatory, enforcement and oversight
mechanisms were extremely weak and parties that used primaries to select candidates
were exempted from the law. This provided a wide degree of agency for party leaders in
deciding to what extent they would comply with the quota, despite concerns about the
fairness and transparency of primaries conducted by the PRD and the PAN.160 The
Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) was nominally responsible for enforcement, oversight,
and interpretation of the quota but in reality did very little to fulfill these
responsibilities.161 A particularly egregious example of the methods employed by party
leaders to circumvent the quota was the “Juanita” scandal.162 Two days after the 2009
midterm election, eight newly elected legislators resigned from their positions and were
replaced by their suplentes.163 All of the legislators who resigned were women and almost
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all of their suplentes were male family members.164 The ensuing scandal and media
attention revealed that this practice was actually relatively common and a repeat in 2010
confirmed beliefs that female legislators were pressured by party leaders into resigning
their seats to men.165
Female journalists, legislators, civil society activists, and party members formed a
group called Mujeres en Plural to advocate for amendments to the quota laws which
would require each proprietario and suplente pairing to be of a single gender and remove
the exemption for primaries.166 A bill was introduced and voted down, a petition was
introduced to the IFE and denied, finally the case was presented to the Federal Electoral
Tribunal (a federal court overseeing election matters) which ruled in favor of Mujeres en
Plural in 2011.167 As a result, in 2012 the proportion of female legislators increased 10
percentage points to 36 percent.168 An amendment in 2014 to raise the quota from 30
percent to 50 percent has since proved highly effective.169
The descriptive success of Mexico’s gender quota was facilitated by features of
the electoral system. The use of PR, large district magnitudes, and closed candidate lists
created a system which was highly compatible with a gender quota. However, other
institutional factors detracted from the quota. Resistance by party leaders and political
clientelism prevented the full implementation of the law in the early years. Indeed, it was
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women’s collaboration, within and across the legislature and civil society, that ensured
the reform and enforcement of the quota and ultimately rendered it successful.

Argentina

Although voluntary party gender quotas were popularized in Scandinavia in the
1970s and 80s, Argentina was the first democratic country to introduce a legislated
candidate quota.170 Argentina’s 1991 gender quota law was followed by similar laws in
11 other Latin American countries, in what some scholars have deemed Latin America’s
Pink Tide.171 It is useful here to highlight some of the features of the Argentine political
and electoral systems. Although democratization was attained earlier in Argentina than in
Mexico – 1983, with consolidation in 1989 – authoritarianism in Argentina was
characterized by military dictatorships alternating with radical populists and high levels
of violence and state terror.172 Despite economic and political turmoil throughout the
1980s and 90s,173 Argentina is currently a stable democracy and ranks highly for political
rights and civil liberties in Freedom House assessments.174
The balance of political parties within Argentina is more complex than in Mexico,
so it is not possible to give a full explanation of the major political parties, their
ideologies, and how each of these have shifted over the time period discussed in this
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paper. To provide some context, however, it is important to note that Argentina has a
long history of popular and powerful Leftist parties. The most prominent of these
traditions is that of the Peronists, who are typically represented by the Justicialist Party
(PJ).175 Within the PJ, there are smaller political coalitions such as FREJUPO, FPV, and
FdT.176 The center-right party, Republican Proposal (PRO), has only won a single
Presidential election since democratization.177 The Radical Civil Union (UCR) is a
socialist party that has not won a Presidential election since 1999.178
Women’s rights in Argentina were jumpstarted under Juan and Eva Perón. During
their leadership, women gained the right to vote (1947) and the Peronist Party
implemented a party quota for its congressional seats (1950).179 As a result, in 1951,
Argentina’s national legislature was 18 percent women – a remarkable achievement at the
time.180 This early introduction of gender quotas and unusually high representation for
women, although short-lived, may have served to establish societal norms concerning the
rights and representation of women. Further, the electoral success of the Peronist Party
may have demonstrated that women as a constituency could influence elections. The
political instability and numerous authoritarian regimes that followed the Peróns makes it
nearly impossible to confirm these hypotheses, but it should be noted that the history of
women’s rights and representation was quite different in Argentina than in the other case
studies.
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Argentina has a President and Vice-President, bi-cameral legislature (Chamber of
Deputies and Senate), and a Supreme Court.181 Like Mexico and Brazil, it is a federal
system with 24 electoral districts.182 Argentina uses exclusively PR, unlike Mexico’s
mixed system, that features closed, rank-ordered candidate lists.183 The Chamber of
Deputies has 257 seats consisting of four year terms that are staggered so that half of the
Chamber is elected every two years.184 District magnitude varies for the Chamber of
Deputies as the number of seats is allocated according to the population of each province,
meaning that some districts have high magnitudes (70 for the Province of Buenos Aires)
but most have low magnitudes between 5 and 10.185 Each district elects three Senators for
a total of 72 seats with a relatively small district magnitude. PR for Senate seats is
structured so that the majority party receives two seats and the party in second-place
receives one seat.186 Until 2001, Senators were chosen through indirect elections and after
2001 through the PR system enumerated above.187 Senate terms are six years with a third
of Senators elected every two years. There are no bans on reelection for seats in the
legislature or for the Presidency.188
The use of closed PR lists allocates enormous power and authority to the party
leaders who determine and rank candidates.189 In Argentina, this access is typically
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controlled by state-level party leaders rather than national ones, which differs slightly
from the power structure in Mexico.190 Further, while Mexico had a ban on reelection
until 2014, Argentina has always allowed federal legislators to seek reelection with no
term limits. This creates a number of differences in the incentives for both candidates and
party leaders. Whereas in Mexico, legislators were only beholden to party leaders if they
intended to seek a different office after their term, Argentine legislators rely on this
support in order to seek reelection for the same office.191 Reelection can also present
challenges for increasing women’s representation. In electoral systems where reelection
is permitted and the representation of women is low, the incumbency advantage of
predominately male legislators can make it more difficult for women to attain office.192
This is more relevant in open list PR and SMD systems, but knowledge of the
incumbency advantage may also disincentivize party leaders from choosing to run new,
female candidates to replace incumbent male candidates of the same party even in a
closed-list system.193 The result of the influence of party leaders over the political careers
of legislators, exacerbated by the use of closed-list PR systems, is that legislators are
highly discouraged from challenging party ideology in any way.194
Voting against party lines can even result in leaders withholding ballot access or
being expelled from the party, and this is true in both Argentina195 and Mexico.196
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Although subsequent chapters will discuss how this dynamic can work against the
substantive representation of women, in Argentina party leaders’ control over legislator
voting has actually been attributed to the adoption of the 1991 quota law.197 During
discussion of the bill, the majority of the legislators from the largest party, the Justicialist
Party (JP), registered staunch opposition to the bill.198 Leaders of the second largest, UCR
Party endorsed the bill, ensuring that UCR legislators would vote to in favor of the quota,
but this would not have been enough to pass the bill.199 It was President Menem’s
instructions to members of his party, the JP, to vote in favor of the bill that guaranteed its
passage.200 Even after voting for the bill, many JP legislators entered their objections into
the legislative transcript, demonstrating the power of party leaders to dictate legislator
voting.201
Prior to the implementation of the quota law, the Ley de Cupos, the legislature
was just four percent women, although women constituted over 50 percent of registered
voters and 47 percent of party members.202 In addition to party leaders in the JP and
UCR, the Ley de Cupos was also supported by a broad and diverse coalition of women,
including party members, legislators, bureaucrats, journalists, and civil society
activists.203 Their intense and focused lobbying for the law was likely an important
motivator in President Menem’s decision to endorse to the bill.204 However, it should be
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noted that while collaboration with civil society occurred similarly to Mexico, party
divisions among women remained.205 Participation in the gender quota movement was
not as ubiquitous among female legislators as in Mexico, and even among supporters
there was significant disagreement over the details of the quota.206 Support from
women’s coalitions was crucial in Argentina as in Mexico, but the influence of party
leaders was more pronounced in the passage of the quota law in Argentina than in
Mexico. Thus, women’s collaboration emerged as an important variable in garnering
support for the quota in Argentina, but female legislators were not nearly as united in
advocating for the quota as they were in Mexico.
The 1991 Ley de Cupos mandated that all party lists for the Chamber of Deputies
contain at least 30 percent women and that the ‘electable’ positions on the candidate lists
contain a minimum of 30 percent female candidates.207 The law did not apply to the
Senate at the time because it used indirect elections and was thus exempted from the Ley
de Cupos. The placement mandate was, however, vague and did not clarify whether
‘electable’ positions referred to all spots on a party’s candidate lists or only the spots a
party could reasonably be expected to win.208 As a result, many party leaders complied by
fielding their 30 percent female candidates in low positions that were unlikely to be
elected.209 A decree by President Menem on International Women’s Day in 1993
specified that the 30 percent also applied to positions reasonably expected to be won and
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outlined the precise number and position of spots that should be allocated to women
based on the number of seats up for reelection, but failed to convince party leaders.210
Despite widespread violations of the law in the 1993 election, no sanctions were enforced
on parties, largely because only those directly affected by non-compliance could bring a
case against the party – meaning that female candidates would have to publicly challenge
their party, finance the cost of the legal challenge personally, and effectively sacrifice
their political careers.211 These challenges were exacerbated by the fact that some judges
refused to enforce the law on the grounds that it violated the Constitutional principle of
equality before the law.212
Women’s representation in the legislature increased in the election, from 5.8
percent in the Chamber of Deputies in 1991 to 14.4 percent in 1993 and from 4.2 percent
in the Senate in 1992 to 6.1 percent in 1995, but further progress could have been made if
the placement mandate was respected and enforced.213 It should also be considered that
although the proportion of women in the Chamber of Deputies increased substantially,
the initial level of representation was very low and the percentage of women after the Ley
de Cupos was equal to the proportion of women in the entire Mexican legislature 5 years
prior to their first national quota law. Disappointed by the election results and frustrated
by the rampant violations of the quota, women’s coalitions again began to rally in support
of the quota law and worked through the National Women’s Council to bring violations
to the National Electoral Chamber to ensure enforcement.214 The 1994 Constitutional
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Assembly was especially critical in ensuring the proper application of the Ley de Cupos.
The selection of legislators to the Assembly was governed by the quota law, resulting in
26 percent representation for women.215 Supported by women’s coalitions outside the
Assembly, female legislators, and some male allies, incorporated the United Nations
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW) into the Constitution and an Article stating that political parties and the
electoral system will guarantee the real equality of political opportunity between men and
women through positive action measures that will never be less than those in effect at the
signing of the Constitution (the Ley de Cupos).216 Another important change to the
Constitution was the reform to the election system for Senators. The Constitution
established that the Senate would, starting in 2001, use a PR system rather than indirect
elections.217 This opened the possibility that the Ley de Cupos would also apply to the
Senate.
Women’s groups launched a sustained legal campaign to ensure this reality and
although they were ultimately successful, they faced significant resistance.218 Women’s
efforts leading up to the 1995 election also helped motivate the Attorney General and the
National Electoral Chamber to begin enforcing the Ley de Cupos.219 Clarifications were
made regarding the placement mandate, ensuring that female candidates were placed in
positions that actually were electable even in instances where parties could only expect to
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win two seats.220 Electoral court judges were ordered to review all candidate lists and
mandate changes to any that violated the quota, and were even authorized to make such
changes themselves if party leaders failed to do so.221 Federal prosecutors were ordered to
monitor the actions of electoral court judges to ensure they complied with these orders.222
These efforts were successful and the proportion of women in the Chamber of
Deputies increased in 1995 to 22 percent, a gain of 7 percentage points from the previous
election.223 This progress was repeated in 1997, and by 2001 women had reached 30
percent of the Chamber of Deputies.224 The proportion of female legislators increased to
40 percent in 2007 and has hovered around that number to date, although a 2017
amendment to the electoral code increased the quota to 50 percent.225 The application of
the Ley de Cupos to Senate elections was secured through a Decree in 2000 by President
de La Rúa.226 Because of the small district magnitude of Senate elections, the Decree
mandated that one of the first two positions on each party’s Senate candidate lists be a
woman.227 The representation of women in the Senate jumped from 3 percent in 1999 to
35.2 percent in 2001.228
In short, women’s collaboration was key in ensuring the implementation,
enforcement, and reform of the quota law. Progress came in steps as women gained more
influence through the 1991 edition of the quota and the Constitutional Assembly, but the

220

Marx, Borner, and Caminotti, “Gender Quotas, Candidate Selection, and Electoral Campaigns,” 49.
Jones, “Increasing Women’s Representation Via Gender Quotas: The Argentine Ley de Cupos,” 89.
222
Ibid.
223
Krook, “Legislative Quotas in Argentina and France,” 165.
224
Ibid.
225
Ibid.
226
Gray, “Electoral Gender Quotas: Lessons from Argentina and Chile,” 62.
227
Ibid.
228
Krook, “Legislative Quotas in Argentina and France,” 165.
221

48

stringent top-down enforcement by government and judicial officials was necessary for
the Ley de Cupos to be truly effective. Despite efforts by activists and female politicians
to implement gender quotas beginning just a few years apart, women reached critical
mass in the Argentine legislature much faster than in Mexico. It is difficult to identify the
precise causal links of the quick success of Argentina’s Ley de Cupos, but it is worth
examining some of the key similarities and differences as these will later be used to
analyze subsequent variations in substantive representation. From an electoral
perspective, although both countries use closed PR lists, Mexico has a mixed system that
also incorporates SMDs.229 This creates challenges for female candidates in these
districts, although the PR lists in Mexico have much larger district magnitude than in
Argentina which could help offset this effect.230
In both countries, the activism and mobilization of women was crucial to passing
the gender quota law and ensuring its proper implementation. The usage of Presidential
decrees to legitimize and enforce the Ley de Cupos is likely the most important
distinguishing factor between Argentina’s and Mexico’s timelines in reaching critical
mass. However, some features of the electoral system in Argentina are more compatible
with gender quotas, such as the use of PR with no elements of SMD, and these likely also
contributed to the faster implementation of the quota.231 The quota law in Mexico did not
enjoy the same kind of support from top party leaders after its initial passage and
appropriate enforcement of the law was only made possible through legal battles and
sustained women’s mobilization. Coalitions including both female legislators and civil
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society groups played important roles in both countries, but these organizations displayed
considerably more unity in their approach in Mexico than in Argentina.232
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Chapter Three
When Quotas Fall Short: Brazil and Chile

This chapter examines descriptive representation in Brazil and Chile. Beginning
with an analysis of the quota laws and their implementation, this chapter compares the
limited descriptive success of quota laws in Brazil and Chile with the achievements made
in Argentina and Mexico. By examining the similarities and differences between the two
sets of case studies in terms of quota law adoption, implementation, and enforcement, this
chapter will evaluate the relevance of cross-national and contextual variables identified in
the previous chapter in order to later analyze their role in substantive representation.
Centering this discussion on Brazil and Chile, this chapter will also contrast efforts by
quota law supporters with those made in Argentina and Mexico and discuss the role of
women’s collaboration in quota law implementation.

Brazil

Although Brazil first implemented a national gender quota law in 1997, requiring
parties to field no more than 30 percent of either gender on their candidate lists, the
proportion of women in the legislature remains well below the global average and even
further below the critical mass threshold.233 Between 1997 and 2020, the percentage of
women in the legislature increased from 6.6 percent to 14.6 percent.234 It is difficult to
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attribute this modest increase to the gender quota, as many countries have experienced
similar, or even more impressive, gains during the same time period. The world average
proportion of women in national parliaments changed from 11.6 percent in 1997 to 25.2
percent in 2020.235 This increase is, in part, due to the many countries that began to
implement legislated gender quotas during this period. However, countries without
quotas have also experienced rising numbers of female legislators, likely due to changes
in attitudes about women, increased education and labor force participation, and
improvements in numerous other factors affecting women’s quality of life and potential
to compete in legislative races.236 Examples of this can be found in various regions of the
world and at different levels of development, including Cambodia, India, Ukraine, and
Zambia.237 Further, there were no notable increases in female representation in Brazil
until 2003, suggesting that the initial gender quota law was mostly ineffective in
increasing representation.238 The proportion of candidates that are women has increased a
result of the quota and hit 30 percent in 2018, but this has not translated into electoral
successes for women.239 Even in 2003, the increase was just two percentage points from
the 1997 level. Other changes occurred in 2014, 2017, and 2018.240
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The national legislature of Brazil consists of a Chamber of Deputies and a Senate
which house 513 and 81 legislators, respectively. Deputies are elected from 27 districts
for four-year terms using open list PR, while Senators are elected from the same districts
for eight-year terms using a majoritarian, first-past-the-post system. The gender quota
applies only to seats in the Chamber of Deputies, as in Argentina between 1991 and
2000. In 1999, nine years after the first national quota was introduce for the Chamber of
Deputies in Argentina and one year before it would be expanded to the Senate, the
proportion of women in the Chamber of Deputies was 24 percentage points higher than
that of the Senate.241 That the proportion of women in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies
(15 percent) is roughly the same as the proportion in the Senate (14 percent) further
supports the assertion that gender quotas in Brazil have had little descriptive impact.242
Brazil’s multi-party system relies on coalitions for governance like Argentina,
which is in contrast to the majority governments that typically hold power in Mexico. 243
Since 1990, the most popular parties have been the Brazilian Democratic Movement
(MDB), Brazil Social Democracy Party (PSDB), and the Worker’s Party (PT).244 The
multi-party system in Brazil is sometimes characterized as unstable and fragile.245 Most
parties do not have consolidated ideological or political platforms and tend to shift their
policies and stances on key issues in response to short-term changes in the surrounding
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political climate.246 Unlike Argentina and Mexico, Brazil uses an open PR system rather
than a closed one.247 This means that candidate lists are not rank ordered by parties but by
voters who determine the order of the list. Voters in Brazil have the option of voting
either for the list as a whole or for individual candidates.248 Voting for individual
candidates, the preferential vote, is more common than voting for the party list in its
entirety.249
One result of this system is a high degree of intra-party competition among
candidates that engenders elections in which individual candidates carry much more
importance than their parties and the personal financial resources of candidates often
decide the outcome.250 The high district magnitude, which ranges from eight to 70,
exacerbates this effect. In the 2018 Sao Paolo Chamber of Deputies race, for example,
1,502 candidates competed for 70 seats.251 One party ran a list of 97 candidates.252
Further compounding the issue is the provision passed alongside the quota law that
parties may, but are not required to, run a number of candidates totaling 150 percent of
the open seats in elections for the Chamber of Deputies.253 The quota applies to the total
number of potential spots on the candidate lists, regardless of whether parties actually fill
these spots.254 Marx, Borner, and Caminotti explain that under these rules, if a district has
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10 seats open then the party can run 15 candidates. If the party ran 15 candidates then 4
would need to be women, but if the party prefers not to run female candidates it can
simply choose to only run 11 candidates that are all men. This does not violate the quota
law, so political parties nearly always have an option to avoid selecting female
candidates.255 While not illegal, this practice certainly contradicts the spirit of the quota
law, so parties that wish to appear to comply with this spirit without actually doing so
have another method.
Laranja refers to female candidates in Brazil who are used to meet the gender
quota but are essentially candidates in name only. They receive little to no support from
the party and are often unqualified because they are not intended to be serious
candidates.256 Unable and often unwilling to truly participate in the highly competitive
races for seats in the Chamber of Deputies, these women have very slim chances of being
elected.257 In some ways, this practice is similar to the use of female candidates as
suplentes in Mexico.258 Both strategies are intended to avoid the election of female
legislators and work to damage the credibility of the quota by artificially injecting
unqualified female candidates into the political arena. The use of laranjas does not
appear to be primarily the result of a lack of viable female candidates, but rather gender
bias in party selection processes.259 A 2008 study of the competitiveness of female
candidates for the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies found that party ideology was the main
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predictor of the proportion of competitive female candidates that a party selects.260 The
study found that left-wing coalitions not only ran the most female candidates, but also ran
female candidates that were more competitive than the average candidate from any party,
male or female.261
The laranja practice is widespread. Wylie found that in the 2014 elections, 48
percent of the female candidates for the Chamber of Deputies could be classified as
laranjas.262 In 2018, this percentage decreased to 35, suggesting some improvement.263
However, the fact that over one third of female candidates were not running serious
campaigns or receiving meaningful party assistance in 2018 is deeply troubling and offers
a compelling explanation for the low proportion of female Deputies in Brazil.
Open list PR systems present challenges to effective quota implementation similar
to those that existed in Argentina and Mexico prior to effective enforcement of placement
mandates in their closed list PR systems.264 Rather than parties clustering female
candidates in the bottom positions of candidate lists, as in Argentina and Mexico, voters
are able to do so themselves by voting for primarily male candidates.265 Thus, the success
of the gender quotas in Brazil hinges more significantly on voter preferences than in
Argentina and Mexico. Using Hinjosa’s framework outlined in Chapter One, it can be
inferred then that while the institutional elements discussed above are important, analysis
of demand side factors is critical to understanding the continued underrepresentation of
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women in the Brazilian legislature.266 The primary demand side factor to consider is voter
preference. This differs from the other case studies in that the open PR system may
prevent gender quotas from functioning successfully in Brazil, even when parties adhere
to the rules and quotas are well-designed and enforced. Unfortunately, in Brazil many
parties are able to exploit loopholes in the quota law, so the challenges created by the
open list system are compounded and exacerbated. Voter preference in this context refers
to attitudes of voters about the suitability of women for political office. Due to the large
percentage of laranja candidates and other efforts by parties to prevent the election of
female legislators, the electoral success of women in Brazil is not an accurate measure of
voters’ willingness to vote for female candidates. Instead, public opinion polls are needed
to shed light on these attitudes and preferences.
A 2010 Pew Research Center survey found that 70 percent of men and 71 of
women in Brazil viewed the election of a female president favorably.267 This was
confirmed with the election of Dilma Roussef as President in 2011. The 2014
AmericasBarometer survey showed that 32 percent of Brazilians agreed with the use of
legislated gender quotas and 28 percent strongly agreed.268 Strikingly, a hypothetical
ballot study of 600 people living in São Paolo revealed a seven percentage point bias in
favor of female candidates.269 These results suggest that although gender inequality

266

Hinojosa, “Why Selection Matters: Explaining Women’s Representation in Politics,” 22.
Richard Wike, “Public Opinion in Brazil: Findings from the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes
Project,” Wilson Center, accessed January 22, 2021, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/public-opinionbrazil-findings-the-pew-research-centers-global-attitudes-project.
268
Frederico Batista Pereira and Nathália F. F. Porto, “Gender Attitudes and Public Opinion Towards
Electoral Gender Quotas in Brazil,” Political Psychology 41, no. 5 (2020): 887–99,
https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12655, 892.
269
Rosario Aguilar, Saul Cunow, and Scott Desposato, “Choice Sets, Gender, and Candidate Choice in
Brazil,” Electoral Studies 39 (September 1, 2015): 230–42, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2015.03.011,
235.
267

57

persists in Brazil, voters are willing to support qualified female candidates and the
majority agree with the use of gender quotas.270 This is consistent with public opinion
about the suitability of women as politicians in studies that survey all of Latin America.
These results also confirm assertions made throughout the literature that although voter
preference and negative attitudes about women are a factor, they are far less significant
than institutional factors.271 In general, the costs that party leaders perceive in running
female candidates are much higher than the actual costs and higher than public opinion
surveys suggest.272
Additionally, while supply side factors play a role in all of the case studies, they
are most relevant in Brazil. The financial costs of running a successful political campaign
present a more intractable barrier in Brazil (and Chile) than in the other case studies
because candidates must compete for voter’s attention with other candidates on the same
party list. Gendered differences in income are prevalent around the world and in Brazil.
Not only is the wage-gap approximately 20 percent in Brazil, female labor force
participation is also low (54 percent) and women are concentrated in low-paying
positions in the service and tourism sectors.273 Between 2014 and 2018 the average
campaign funding of white male candidates was two and half times higher than the
funding of white female candidates.274 The gap in funding between Afro-descendant
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women and white men was significantly higher.275 Much of this funding is self-financed
and some is collected from donations.276 The 2015 ban on corporate contributions to
federal deputy races has helped narrow this gap, but it remains high.277 However, gender
equality progress on a number of fronts in Brazil has led to a large pool of eligible and
aspirant female candidates.278
Over 44 percent of political party members in Brazil are women279 and 52 percent
of voters in the most recent election were women, although it should be noted that voting
is compulsory.280 A 2018 study by Instituto Locomotiva and UN Women revealed that
the majority of Brazilian women are interested in politics and in increasing the
representation of women in the political sphere.281 The study found that over 90 percent
of women believed that there should be more female representation in politics and that
they were not adequately represented by current politicians.282 Over 70 percent said that
they felt their vote could have an impact and that they were interested in politics.283
Further, although women are less likely to work than men, they are more likely to have
received a tertiary degree of some kind.284 These results support the claim that supply
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side barriers to increased representation in Brazil stem more from financial and perceived
institutional barriers than from a lack of interested or qualified candidates.
Brazil’s quota law makes some efforts to correct for demand and supply side
disadvantages for female candidates. In 2009, the original law was amended to add
provisions concerning the use of party funds and televised air time.285 Political parties in
Brazil are allocated free broadcast time to advertise their platform and candidates during
election years. Per the 2009 amendment, parties were required to devote a minimum of
10 percent of this time to promoting women’s political participation.286 This has since
increased to 15 percent of their free broadcast time. Parties must further allocate at least
five percent of their public campaign funds to the same purpose.287 Non-compliance
results in a fine equivalent to 12.5 percent of the funds that were supposed to have been
spent on advocating the political participation of women.288 Additionally, during the
election campaign season, the Superior Electoral Court airs five minutes of educational
campaigns about women’s political participation per day.289 These provisions should play
an important role in supporting the success of the gender quota law and educating voters
about the significance of female political participation. It is not clear from that these aims
have been achieved. The wording of “promoting women’s political participation” is
vague.290 Parties can choose whether they promote their own female candidates or
whether they use it to deliver standardized messages about gender equality in politics.
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Although political parties are not legally allowed to purchase additional television or
radio advertisement, political parties still focus the vast majority of their advertisement
time on male candidates.291
There are numerous factors contributing to the low political representation of
women in Brazil, but the most compelling explanatory variables put forth in the literature
thus far are institutional. The open list PR system and the allowance for parties to run
candidates numbering 150 percent of available seats are electoral features that
disadvantage female candidates.292 Under these conditions, female candidates that are not
electoral ‘ringers’ require significant investment from party leaders who seem reluctant to
provide this kind of support.293 The quota law is self-sabotaging in that it applies only to
the seats a party fills and that there are no oversight or enforcement mechanisms
concerning the laranja practice.294 The weak nature and many loopholes of the gender
quota law combined with certain features of the electoral system and the apparent lack of
will by party leaders to genuinely support increased female representation creates a
perfect storm in which it would be surprising if the quota was effective. All of these
factors create barriers for women in moving from aspirant to candidate and from
candidate to office holder, but they also prevent women from transitioning from eligible
to aspirant. Despite an interest in politics, women are held back from becoming aspiring
candidates by the blatant and overwhelming evidence that party leaders do not want
serious female candidates, that women receive less support from their parties, and that

291

Wylie, “Taking Bread off the Table: Race, Gender, Resources and Political Ambition in Brazil,” 130-35.
Mala N Htun, “Dimensions of Political Inclusion and Exclusion in Brazil: Gender and Race”
(Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank, December 2003), 4-5.
293
Moisés and Sanchez, “Women’s Political Representation in Brazil,” 28-32.
294
Wylie, “Taking Bread off the Table: Race, Gender, Resources and Political Ambition in Brazil,” 135.
292

61

women have lower electoral success.295 These challenges mount on top of the other issues
women in Brazil face, such as femicide, domestic abuse, a high wage gap, and the
‘double shift’ of wives and mothers, to make running for office a nearly Herculean task.
However, institutional variables alone may not be enough to explain the lack of
reform and commitment to adequate enforcement of the quota law in Brazil. Similar
issues were initially apparent in both Argentina and Mexico and were subsequently
resolved. In understanding why this process has not occurred in Brazil, it is necessary to
examine why it did happen in Argentina and Mexico. The answer in both cases rests
largely with the sustained activism of women’s coalitions, including both legislators and
civil society groups, to ensure the proper implementation of gender quotas in both letter
and spirit. These movements formed in the initial push for quotas in both countries.
However, such a movement never came about in Brazil. In explaining how a quota law
was passed without this support Arújo states, “It must be mentioned that their
introduction [gender quotas] did not stem from a position of consensus or a maturity of
the debate in Brazilian society, but, rather, from the absence of both.”296 By this, Arújo
means that little debate took place over the passage of gender quotas because many party
leaders and legislators did not even consider the issue to be fundamentally about gender
parity.297 Rather, quotas were understood by many as vague, possibly temporary,
methods of promoting the legitimacy of the nascent democracy.298 It is thus not surprising
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that even many Brazilian feminists were divided on the topic.299 As a result, no
movement or coalitions formed to advocate for the law, so none were available after the
law passed to ensure its reform and enforcement.

Chile

Chile is the last of the four case studies to have implemented a national legislated
gender quota. The quota, introduced in 2015 as part of a larger constitutional amendment,
requires political parties to field no more than 60 percent of either gender on their
candidate lists for the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate.300 Women currently comprise
23 percent of legislators in both.301 Prior to the implementation of the quota, women
represented approximately 16 percent of the legislature. After just one national election
cycle, this increased to 23 percent.302 The next elections will occur in November 2021.
Notably, the gender quota was passed during the second term of Chile’s first female
president, Michelle Bachelet. President Bachelet advocated for measures to improve
gender equality throughout both her terms in office, and her support for the quota and
immense efforts in passing the 2015 constitutional amendment package were
undoubtedly crucial in the adoption of Chile’s gender quota.303
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The later adoption of the gender quota in Chile leaves less data with which to
evaluate its descriptive success. However, it is possible to compare the rate of change in
women’s representation in the first election cycle with the quota with the changes seen in
Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. The first election cycles after quotas were introduced in
Argentina, Mexico, and Brazil yielded +148,304 +60,305 and -10306 percent changes,
respectively, in the proportion of women in each Chamber of Deputies. In Chile, the
percent increase in women’s representation in the Chamber of Deputies after one election
cycle was 43 percent.307 These numbers show that Chile’s gender quota has initially been
successful, but less so than Argentina and Mexico. However, it is important to consider
that Chile’s level of female representation prior to the quota was much higher than in
Argentina and Mexico. The Chilean case provides a valuable opportunity to examine how
accumulated regional knowledge and evidence on gender quotas influences the
implementation of quotas. The initial success of the quota in Chile also suggests that
Brazil’s limited changes in women’s representation cannot be attributed wholly to the use
of open list PR, which is used in Chile, as well. Further, the overall degree of gender
equality in Chile and the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the quota law present
critical information for deciphering the connection between descriptive and substantive
representation and the role of gender quotas in increasing substantive representation.
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The 2015 constitutional amendment package introduced a number of significant
changes to the electoral system in Chile. Both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate
increased in size, from 120 to 155 and from 38 to 50, respectively.308 Significant
redistricting also took place. Prior to 2015, there were 60 districts for Deputies and 19 for
Senators and each district elected two Deputies and two Senators.309 While this system
also used open list PR, the small district size resulted in a binomial system wherein each
party (or coalition) was only allowed to present two candidates per district.310 This
created a number of electoral and political issues especially in light of the coalition-style
governance practiced in Chile.311 The increased district size achieved in 2015 made
negotiations over candidate lists much easier for the seven-party coalition in power at the
time.312 Further, these reforms reduced the incumbency advantage experienced in the old
system and made elections more competitive by creating more space for smaller and noncoalition parties.313 These results are favorable to female candidates, as the literature
explains that small district magnitude314 and high incumbency advantage315 are key
barriers to increased women’s representation. It is likely that a gender quota introduced
into the pre-2015 electoral system would have engendered very few gains in women’s
representation because the binomial system created conditions in which parties needed to
nominate highly financed candidates with name recognition to be successful.316
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It is important to note that in Chile, as in Brazil, no prominent movement emerged
to advocate for gender quotas. Certainly, the measure had many supporters in the
legislature and among voters, but there was no formation of coalitions to lobby for the
quota.317 The introduction of the quota was, in many ways, a top-down initiative. With
President Bachelet as a staunch supporter and her party firmly in the majority, there was
no need for such a movement. Furthermore, female legislators in Chile were deeply
divided on the issue of gender quotas, which is discussed more thoroughly in Chapter
Five.318 So, the process of designing, implementing, and enforcing the gender quota
occurred without the cross-party, cross-sectional women’s collaboration that defined this
process in Argentina and Mexico.
There are a number of important features of the Chilean gender quota. Notably,
women must constitute at least 40 percent of each candidate list which is much higher
than the initial quotas in the other three case studies.319 Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico
started with 30 percent quotas. As the quotas proved effective in Argentina320 and
Mexico,321 this number increased to 50 percent. There has been no change in Brazil,
likely because it has yet to meet the 30 percent target.322 Much like the early rendition of
the Mexican quota, Chilean parties may be exempted from the quota if they use primaries
to select their candidates.323 However, the quota sets a limit on the number of candidates
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that can be chosen through primaries, likely to prevent the same issues this provision
caused in Mexico. Up to 40 percent of a party’s candidates may be selected through
primaries, but at least 60 percent must be selected by party leaders.324 This allows parties
to give voters more influence over their candidates, but also ensures that regardless of
which candidates voters choose parties will still be able to select enough female
candidates to fulfill the quotas.
Unlike in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, the quota law in Chile directly
incentivizes political parties to nominate and support female candidates with electoral
potential.325 Parties receive a state-funded grant of approximately 20,000 USD for each
female candidate that wins a seat in the Chamber of Deputies or the Senate.326 This
provision rewards parties for investing time and resources into female candidates and
discourages parties from running non-viable candidates to fill the quota. The use of a
positive incentive for nominating competitive female candidates is especially important
because the 2015 amendment also allowed parties to nominate candidates totaling the
total number of open seats plus one.327 This creates similar challenges for women as the
150 percent rule in Brazil, but on a smaller scale which is counteracted somewhat by the
financial rewards of investing in strong female candidates.
The most unique feature of the Chilean quota law is the time limit placed on its
implementation. No other gender quotas in Latin America are temporary.328 The 2015
amendment specified that the quota would apply only to four elections, beginning in 2017
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and ending in 2029.329 There are two potential reasons for the time limit which are at
odds with each other, but most likely worked in conjunction when the law was passed.
First, proponents of the quota were optimistic that with the other electoral reforms being
permanent only a few elections cycles with the quota would be needed for women’s
representation to increase dramatically and remain at high levels.330 Second, legislators
who opposed the law on the grounds that gender quotas are ‘undemocratic,’ ineffective,
result in the selection of underqualified female candidates, etc., may have advocated
intensely for, or been appeased by, the time limit.331 Current research does not show a
definitive answer on why the quota is temporary, but scholars argue that once the time is
up it is highly unlikely that the quota will ever be re-introduced.332 To renew the quota
would require another revision to the electoral code, yet it took 20 attempts at reforming
the code to pass the first gender quota.333
The initial success of the gender quota in Chile despite the use of open list PR
means that further examination of the claim that gender quotas are significantly hindered
by open PR systems is needed. While Brazil as a case study supports this claim, Chile
does not. Richard Matland’s research on factors affecting quota implementation in
developed and developing countries provides a solid hypothesis as to why the effects of
open list PR seem to vary between the two case studies. Matland’s study used a statistical
analysis of the correlations between the percentage of women in the national legislature
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and female labor force participation, women’s “cultural standing,” level of development,
and electoral system in two data sets.334 The first data set was comprised of 24
industrialized democracies, the second was 16 less developed democracies.335 He found
that the electoral system variable (PR or majoritarian) was statistically significant and
positive in the industrialized democracies, but not in the less developed democracies.336
Essentially, the positive correlation between PR systems and women’s
representation observed in many studies was true in developed democracies but not
necessarily in developing countries. To explain this result, Matland suggests that the
incentive system for parties to gender balance tickets in PR systems functions differently
in industrialized countries than in developing ones. While including women in candidate
lists allows parties to broaden their constituencies and appeal to female and progressive
voters in some PR systems, he argues that this effect is dampened in developing countries
where, “the perceived costs of nominating women are so great that parties prefer to run
virtually all-male slates.”337 Matland explains that political costs for nominating women
arise when negative attitudes towards women’s capacity as legislators are common,
women do not constitute a large voter base, and movements for increased female
representation are inactive or non-vocal.338
Although Matland’s study considers the relationship between women’s
representation and PR systems in general, it is possible to draw a line from his findings to
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the question of why open list PR is seemingly a hindrance in Brazil and not in Chile.
While PR systems are positively correlated with women’s representation in many
countries, this effect is much more pronounced in closed list systems than in open
ones.339 If his conclusion that the perceived costs of nominating women are so high in
developing countries that they can counteract the otherwise positive effects of PR
systems is accurate, then a logical argument can be made that in Brazil the combination
of open lists and high perceived costs of running female candidates severely reduces the
efficacy of the gender quota. In Chile, where the gender quota seems to be functioning in
an open list system, it is likely that the perceived costs of placing female candidates in
electable spots are much lower than in Brazil. Evaluating the accuracy of this claim
requires understanding why parties in Brazil and Chile perceive these costs differently
and how parties are involved in the underrepresentation of women.
Perceived costs of nominating female candidates can come in many forms. The
two most important to consider are electoral costs to the party (voter preference and
competitiveness of female candidates) and costs to male politicians who may lose their
seat to female candidates. The latter cost is widely cited as one of the primary reasons
that the Chilean gender quota was not passed until 2015 despite decades of advocacy
work and many legislative attempts at a quota.340 However, the majority of Chileans have
supported the use of a gender quota since at least 2006 when a poll showed that over 70
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percent of respondents agreed with a quota that was being proposed at the time.341 One
way to evaluate gender bias in voters, other than through surveys, is to examine the
electoral success of male and female incumbents with similar qualifications and levels of
competitiveness. Shair-Rosenfield and Hinjosa did this in a 2014 study of Chile and
found that female incumbents were three percent more likely to be re-elected than male
incumbents.342 The study also examined re-nomination of both incumbent men and
women and non-incumbent men and women. Non-incumbent in this context does not
refer to new candidates, but rather candidates who have previously held the seat, lost it in
an election, and want to run for it again.343 They found that incumbent women were two
percentage points more likely to be re-nominated than their male counterparts.344 For
non-incumbents, women were four percentage points less likely to be re-nominated than
men.345
These results suggest that party leaders are willing to support female candidates
through nomination when they have a proven record of success. In fact, parties are
slightly more likely to nominate women who have performed well electorally than men
who have done the same, although the difference is not statistically significant.346 The
study also reveals that when experience, qualification, and competitiveness are equal,
Chilean voters do not exhibit gender bias in their voting.347 Overall, it appears that the
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nomination behavior of party leaders and the voting patterns of Chileans are strategic
rather than dominated by gender biases.348 Political parties do not perceive a greater cost
in nominating female candidates of equal competitive value to male candidates. Without
a similar study having been done in Brazil, it is difficult to make a direct comparison.
However, the behavior of party elites in so actively trying to circumvent the gender
quota, sometimes in ways that seem to be actually detrimental to the electoral success of
the party, such as using laranjas instead of competitive female candidates, shows that
party leaders in Brazil sometimes prioritize gender bias over strategic choices.349 While
this may help to explain some of the gap between female representation in Brazil and
Chile, it provides no information about potential bias in the nomination processes for
political newcomers, where perceived costs may be greater for female candidates.
Bjarnegård and Zetterberg observe throughout Latin America that political parties
that have formal, bureaucratized candidate selection processes increase their proportion
of female candidates, on average, by 88 percent when a gender quota is introduced,
whereas parties that have informal selection processes see an increase of just 22
percent.350 They characterize nearly all political parties in Chile as using highly informal
selection processes, which is in line with other conclusion from the literature.351
Although some scholars remark that formal selection processes can disadvantage female
candidates this is usually in reference to primaries. The regulation of the percentage of
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candidates that can be elected under primaries in Chile helps to ensure that their use does
not impede the nomination of enough female candidates to fulfill the quota. In the 2017
election, approximately 42 percent of candidates for the Chamber of Deputies and 41
percent for the Senate were women, suggesting that parties largely complied with the
gender quota.352 However, the disparity between the percentage of female candidates and
women that were elected necessitates examining whether party selection methods
produced a high number of less qualified female candidates in Chile, as they did in
Brazil.
In the 2013 elections, nearly 21 percent of female candidates for the Chamber of
Deputies were elected and 33 percent of women that ran for the Senate were elected.353
By comparison, 27 percent of male candidates were elected to the Chamber of Deputies
and 29 percent to the Senate.354 In 2017, nine percent of female candidates and 21 percent
of male candidates for the Chamber of Deputies were successful women.355 For the
Senate, 19 percent of female candidates and 42 percent of men were elected.356 Although
the redistricting that took place in 2015 makes it difficult to compare how the
competitiveness of candidates overall changed between 2013 and 2017, it is possible to
evaluate changes in the competition gap between men and women in the two election
cycles. Before the gender quota was implemented, female candidates were being elected
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at similar rates to their male counterparts. After the quota, the competitive gap between
men and women widened considerably for both chambers.
Studies of other countries in Latin America, including Mexico, have observed that
the proportion of female candidates that are highly qualified and very competitive
sometimes dips in the first one or two election cycles after the implementation of a
gender quota.357 Scholars attribute this effect to gender biased recruitment and selection
processes which, in the absence of a quota, allow only the most competitive women to be
nominated.358 The ability of parties to identify viable female candidates and the
willingness of qualified women to self-select and put themselves forward for nomination
also take time to grow. It is possible that some specificities of Chilean candidate selection
procedures have exacerbated this issue. Franceschet notes that final decisions on
candidate nominations, for those not selected through primaries, are made not by party
leaders, but at the level of the national coalition.359 This decision-making process is
highly informal and is led by non-elected elites, mostly men, from the various parties of
the coalition360. The nature of these negotiations makes it extremely difficult for
advocates of increased female representation to have their voices heard at the highest
level.361 Further, the distance of the national coalition from local party organizers may
impede efforts to scout and recruit potential new female candidates.
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Although the proportion of women in the Chilean legislature increased less
rapidly in the first election cycle after the gender quota than in Argentina and Mexico,
there is reason to be optimistic about the potential for women’s representation to reach
the 40 percent target within the time frame set by the quota. The open list system leaves
some of the outcome up to voters, but public opinion polls and the presence of women in
other important elected and appointed positions suggests that this will not be a significant
barrier. Further, parties are complying with the law and have strong financial incentives
to continue doing so. The primary concern with Chile’s gender quota is that it will expire
after the 2029 elections. Other changes to the electoral code, such as redistricting and the
end of the binomial system, will remain and should continue to facilitate the nomination
and election of women. How the representation of women evolves in Chile over the next
15 to 20 years will provide a great deal of insight into the impact of gender quotas and the
strength of the connection between descriptive and substantive representation. If Chile
reaches the 40 percent target and is able to maintain this after the quota expires, this will
demonstrate that gender quotas can meaningfully change the gender dynamics of the
political sphere.
While Chile’s gender quota has been more successful than Brazil’s thus far,
neither quota emerged as a result of popular mobilization or collective women’s activism.
In both countries, the quota was achieved through top-down approaches in which little
substantive debate was undertaken. For Brazil, this has resulted in a lack of political will
to reform the flawed law or to even adequately enforce the current law, so descriptive
representation has not increased. In Chile, the quota was introduced as a temporary
measure, and it is still uncertain whether the results will be long-lasting. Chapter five will
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explore how these dynamics have influenced the substantive representation of women in
each country.
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Chapter Four
Substantive Representation at Critical Mass: Mexico and Argentina

This chapter examines the extent and quality of substantive representation in
Argentina and Mexico. Critical mass theory argues that female legislators in a chamber
with 30 percent women should be able to effectively formulate and advance policy goals
that reflect women’s interests.362 With 40 and 48 percent women in their respective
national legislatures, these two case studies have not only reached critical pass, but also
surpassed it by a significant margin.363 Thus, Argentina and Mexico provide valuable
opportunities to interrogate the link between descriptive and substantive representation.
There are a number of ways to measure and interpret substantive representation, as
discussed in the introduction of this paper. In doing so, it is important to distinguish
between the willingness of female legislators to work towards women’s interests and
their ability to do so effectively. The introduction clarifies the use of the term ‘women’s
interests’ as it is used in this paper and explains why a value-neutral approach has been
adopted. However, this chapter will distinguish between policies that align with
conventional feminist views and those that do not when appropriate. It is also important
to note here that the lens this chapter uses to analyze the substantive representation of
women is only one of many different and valid perspectives. This chapter, and the next,
focus on how female legislators represent women, but of course male legislators are also
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able to represent women’s interests. Examining how male legislators’ preferences, voting
patterns, and bill sponsorship has changed as a result of gender quotas would be an
excellent way to study the symbolic effects of gender quotas in generating widespread
cultural shifts.
To evaluate the willingness of female legislators to act in women’s interests, this
chapter uses data on bill sponsorship and introduction, legislator views and attitudes, and
organizations for women’s collaboration. Examining the ability of female legislators to
achieve women’s interests, this chapter looks at formal and informal women’s
institutions, the presence of women in decision-making roles such as sub-committees and
positions in the executive branch, and the success rates of women’s interest bills. Finally,
this chapter endeavors to clarify the links between descriptive and substantive
representation through connecting the successes and failures of substantive representation
with those of the quota laws in Argentina and Mexico.

Mexico

The World Economic Forum releases an annual Global Gender Gap Index in
which countries receive scores from 0 (imparity) to 1 (parity) according to four topics:
Economic participation, Educational attainment, Health and survival, and Political
empowerment.364 Between the first year data was collected in 2006 and 2020, Mexico has
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increased its score from 0.65 to 0.75.365 As a result, it has moved from the 75th most equal
country in terms of gender equality to the 25th.366 This impressive achievement is due
almost entirely to improvements in the political empowerment score, which has more
than tripled since 2006, with minor gains in economic participation.367 The empowerment
score is based largely on the percentage of women in the national legislature. There is
also one data point for number of year under a female head of state, which is zero for
Mexico. Examining these figures, it is apparent that despite increases in ‘political
empowerment,’ there have been very few improvements for women in education, health,
or employment.368 Other persistent gender inequalities in Mexico include the high rates
of femicide, sexual assault, and domestic violence.369 More troubling is that some of
these issues have worsened even as women’s political opportunities have improved. Over
the past five years, for example, instances of femicide have increased by 137 percent.370
These figures all suggest that there is considerable work to be done in terms of
promoting gender equality and, more broadly, women’s interests. While equal
representation is itself a worthy goal, it may seem meaningless to women who continue
to suffer from, and lose their lives due to, continued gender inequality. It has been nine
years since women reached critical mass in Mexico and three since gender parity was
achieved in the legislature, so there is significant data to draw upon in evaluating
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women’s substantive representation.371 After this length of time, it could be reasonably
expected to see improvements in the other indicators expressed above, but the Mexican
case necessitates understanding the limitations of the state. On some issues, the ability of
legislators to affect real change is challenged by problems with the funding and
enforcement of laws. Current levels of violence, the strength of non-state actors, and high
levels of poverty in some areas may place constraints on the efficacy of women’s interest
legislation even if substantive representation is high. The same can be said of Brazil in
the next chapter.
In analyzing substantive representation, it is important to discuss the vehicles and
mechanisms for women’s interest legislation in Mexico. The extensive involvement of
female legislators in the adoption of the gender quota in Mexico led to the creation of a
number of formal and informal cross-partisan venues for discussing issues of women’s
rights and representation. Although there is no formal Women’s Caucus in the legislature,
female Deputies and Senators established the ‘informal’ Women’s Parliament of Mexico
(PMM) in 1998.372 The PMM meets annually and includes legislators, civil society
members, journalists, and academics.373 It regularly works with legislative committees on
issues relating to gender equality and gender mainstreaming. Collaboration through the
PMM also led to the establishment of the bicameral Commission on Gender Equality
(CIG).374 Membership in the CIG is restricted to women, and the committee enjoys
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significant latitude in legislative powers.375 Like most committees in the Mexican
congress, the CIG is able to author and sponsor bills, but it also has legislative review
power.376 Draft bills are often sent to the CIG for gendered review of language and
potential impact. For bills dealing with certain topics this review process is mandatory.
The CIG is also distinct from women’s groups in many other legislatures around the
world in that it is generally well-regarded by both male and female politicians.377 While
Women’s Caucuses and similar organizations in many legislatures struggle to attract
female legislators – due to concerns about negative reception from their male
counterparts and being ‘pigeon-holed’ into only worked on issues relating to women and
children – the CIG is popular among women from a variety of political parties, including
the conservative PAN.378 The PMM and the CIG are significant components of
substantive representation, and of understanding substantive representation, for several
reasons.
The establishment of these bodies is a testament to the efficiency and solidarity of
the movement for women’s political representation; these bodies were a major step
towards quota adoption in Mexico and the result of the strong political will of female
legislators. The PMM and the CIG continue to serve as venues for cross-party
mobilization on a number of issues, including reproductive rights, violence against
women, and economic policies to support women.379 Notably, the inclusion and activity
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of conservative female legislators from the late 1990s to the current day demonstrates the
ability of female legislators to overcome partisan divides and work as a unified
movement when necessary.380 The majority of women’s interest bills introduced in
Mexico originate directly or indirectly from the PMM and the CIG, meaning that these
bodies are also legislative powerhouses for women’s substantive representation.381 The
significance of all of this is that female legislators have organizations through which to
leverage their critical mass and the political will and savvy to do so even in spite of
partisan divides.
Piscopo notes, however, that while the wide policy remits and consensus-building
norms of the CIG lend a wide policy scope and significant degree of political capability
for female legislators, the CIG does not encourage policy depth.382 Essentially, the high
degree of institutionalization of the CIG and its cross-partisan nature allow female
legislators to act as a collective to promote gender mainstreaming on a spectrum of
policy issues. However, these same qualities prevent the CIG from serving as a vehicle
for feminist change. This perspective aligns with the observable outcomes of the CIG.
While its members have made a great deal of progress on issues where ideological and
partisan differences are negligible or can be easily overcome, such as violence against
women or gendered development plans, more controversial topics, such as abortion, are
often avoided.383
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Although some scholars point to the issue of abortion as an illustration of the
limits of female substantive representation in Mexico, Piscopo notes that the reluctance
of the CIG to act on reproductive rights can be perceived as a function of ideological and
partisan divides among women rather than oppression of female legislators by male party
leaders.384 Lopreite concurs, noting that Mexico’s political climate is distinct from many
other Latin American countries in the highly programmatic nature of its political parties
and the steep ideological divides between them.385 This, she adds, has prevented progress
on some feminist issues at the national level, although increased representation of women
in leftist parties, such as the PRD, and the continued mobilization of women’s civil
society groups has led to tangible outcomes at the subnational level in territories
controlled by left-leaning parties.386 Later portions of this chapter will discuss the role of
party politics and the relative power of female legislators compared to their male
counterparts. The most important aspects of the CIG are that female legislators in Mexico
have a committee with substantial legislative powers that is focused solely on gender
equality and not, for example, women and children.
The CIG provides an excellent policy environment for women’s interests, but do
female legislators face marginalization in bill sponsorship and passage and how are they
represented in other legislative committees? Kerevel and Atkeson conducted a study in
2013 of the legislative success and representation of women in the Mexican Chamber of
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Deputies between 2000 and 2009.387 In 2000, women constituted 16 percent of the
Chamber.388 By 2009, 27 percent of Deputies were women.389 Examining bill
sponsorship, the study found that throughout the three legislative terms measured, men
and women sponsored bills at comparable rates and that there was no significant change
in the relative sponsorship of bills by gender due to the gender quota.390 These results
contradict the ‘backlash’ theory advanced by some opponents of critical mass, who argue
that the increased representation of women causes male legislators to marginalize their
female counterparts more than before the introduction of quotas.391 However, the results
also do not provide evidence for increase legislative relevance or activity of female
Deputies after the quota.
Kerevel and Atkeson also found that there were no statistically significant
discrepancies in bill passage rates between male and female Deputies across the three
legislative periods.392 Moreover, the study revealed that women’s interest bills passed
floor votes at a much higher rate than other bills.393 These results do not speak to the final
success of bill sponsored by women, as all bills must receive a majority in both Chambers
and be approved by the President. However, this study suggests that bill sponsorship and
success in the Chamber of Deputies is similar for men and women, that this has not

387

Yann P. Kerevel and Lonna Rae Atkeson, “Explaining the Marginalization of Women in Legislative
Institutions,” The Journal of Politics 75, no. 4 (October 1, 2013): 980–92,
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381613000960. 982.
388
“Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments – Mexico.” The World Bank Group (1990 –
2019).
389
Ibid.
390
Kerevel and Atkeson, “Explaining the Marginalization of Women in Legislative Institutions,” 987.
391
Kathleen A. Bratton, “The Effect of Legislative Diversity on Agenda Setting: Evidence from Six State
Legislatures,” American Politics Research 30, no. 2 (March 1, 2002): 115–42,
https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X02030002001, 119-20.
392
Kerevel and Atkeson, “Explaining the Marginalization of Women in Legislative Institutions,” 986.
393
Ibid, 989.

84

changed significantly as a result of the gender quota, and that women’s interest bills are
not stifled by male Deputies. These findings would benefit greatly from a similar study
examining legislative behavior over the past 12 years, but, unfortunately, such research is
not currently available.
Analyzing where women are represented in the Mexican legislature, numerous
studies have found that the distribution of legislative power is not equal between men and
women. Male legislators are slightly more likely to be members of party leadership than
their female counterparts.394 Further, although men and women occupy similar numbers
of leadership positions in the legislature, women are underrepresented in high prestige
legislative committees, particularly those concerning economics and finance.395 Instead,
female legislators are concentrated in low prestige committees, especially those relating
to social welfare. In the executive branch, women have been historically
underrepresented in cabinet positions.396 Although President Lopez-Obrador’s current
cabinet is 50 percent women,397 this can be understood to be a product of the left-leaning
policies of his political party, the National Regeneration Movement, rather than a general
trend towards increased representation of women in executive positions. Since 2000,
President Lopez-Obrador’s cabinet is the first to contain more than three women at any
one time.398 Zetterberg demonstrates that there is little evidence for a ‘role model effect’
in executive positions at the national or subnational level in Mexico, explaining that the
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ban on re-election until 2015, prevalence of clientelism, and deeply entrenched maledominated political networks all continue to work against women in positions outside the
legislature.399
Having established that a powerful legislative vehicle exists for women’s interest
legislation, that female Deputies sponsor bills and get them passed at similar rates to their
male counterparts, and that increased representation in the legislature has not translated
perfectly to increased representation in executive positions at the national or subnational
level, it is now important to examine women’s interest bills in Mexico. Studies
examining specifically the passage of women’s interests bill in Mexico were not located.
Scholars analyzing bill introduction note that party leaders are able to maintain control
over voting behavior through roll-call voting, which allows legislators to introduce bills
with a high degree of autonomy as bills are typically unable to advance without support
from party leaders.400 This feature of the Mexican political environment limits the ability
of female legislators to vote in favor of women’s interests, but allows for the introduction
of a wide array of bills. However, as party platforms and the balance of power between
political parties have shifted new opportunities for more progressive women’s interest
legislation may have opened.
Two studies on bill introduction allow for examination of the periods 1997-2009
and 2015-2019. Piscopo’s 2014 study covers the first period, finding a statistically
significant correlation between the proportion of women in the legislature and the
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percentage of women’s interest bills introduced.401 Further, female legislators do seem to
represent women’s interests much more than male legislators, sponsoring 73 percent of
such bills between 1997 and 2009.402 In fact, of all the female legislators in office during
this period, 31 percent sponsored at least one women’s interest bill.403 Among male
legislators, the figure was just five percent.404 Female legislators were also much more
likely to sponsor bills coded by researchers as feminist, as opposed to simply women’s
interest.405 This tendency was true across political parties; Piscopo found that a female
legislator of the conservative PAN was still more likely to introduce a feminist bill than a
male legislator from the leftist PRD.406 However, throughout the 1997-2009 period,
women’s interest bills remained a small portion of total bills introduced, increasing from
nearly five percent to just under seven percent by 2009.407 This study shows that female
legislators work to represent women’s interests, that increased representation is correlated
with higher proportions of women’s interest bills, and that women are more likely than
men to sponsor feminist legislation.
Vidal-Correa’s study of women’s interest bills from 2015-2019 focuses on the
first year of the two legislative periods during this time frame, 2015 and 2018.408 This
study also found an increase in the proportion of bills that represented women’s interests,
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from seven percent to 11 percent.409 Female legislators during this period also sponsored
the majority of women’s interest bills – 67 percent in 2015 and 80 percent in 2018.410
Vidal-Correa’s study delved further into the content of women’s interest bills than
Piscopo’s work, revealing that in the 2015-2019 period such bills demonstrated
meaningful and responsive policy work. The most commonly addressed issues in
women’s interest bills were violence, gender quotas, and employment.411 While most
bills continued to conceptualize women as mothers and caretakers – for example most of
the employment bills focused on maternity leave, child care, and access to breastfeeding
facilities – there was also a clear commitment to the increased representation of women
in nontraditional roles.412 Gender quota bills were sponsored for the Supreme Court and
the police force, while other proposed legislation aimed to promote women in the
military.413 Bills on violence against women were similarly significant, covering the
gamut from the characterization of violence, to punishment, to prevention programs, to
care for victims.414 These results suggest that female legislators do seek to represent
women’s interests, but not always feminist interests. Further, women’s interest
legislation, although increasing with the descriptive representation of women, remains a
small portion of total bills and is not a central focus for most legislators. Vidal-Correa’s
conclusion eloquently explains the progress made in the substantive representation of
women in Mexico and the work that remains to be done.
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“Yes, women legislators seem to be more likely than men to sponsor WI [Women’s Interest] bills,
but the work of all legislators is yet to embrace identity politics. Furthermore, the connection
between descriptive and substantive representation exists. However, it is not isolated from the
political context and from the beliefs and ideologies of the legislators. Perhaps the best way to
guarantee substantive representation that truly targets women´s issues is by defining this concept
through a collective process. If this is the case, legislators need to work hand in hand with
women´s agencies and committees as well as any other organisations capable of articulating
interests. This does not imply that women legislators are not addressing women´s interests. As the
data show, women legislators, until very recently, were mostly the ones pushing the issues on the
agenda. By working with other actors, individuals, or organisations, and maybe becoming more
experienced, legislators will achieve a process that recognises the significance of articulating
interests, and with this, better represent all types of women, of all identities.”415

While female legislators in Mexico have many of the tools necessary to represent
women’s interests, these interests remain relatively narrow and bills are focused on topics
where consensus-building is easily achievable. The will of female legislators to act on
behalf of the women they represent is just the first step in achieving representation. The
numerical increases in female legislators have made it possible for women to express this
will through bill introduction and to pass legislation on some issues, but true substantive
representation ultimately requires that women’s interests be promoted in their full breadth
and depth. This has yet to be achieved in Mexico. Further, while it is encouraging that
female legislators are so willing to sponsor women’s interest legislation, the continued
scarcity of male legislators doing the same suggests that critical mass has not engendered
a broader shift in political culture or attitudes about women. This is not to say that
substantive representation has failed in Mexico. As later portions of this paper will show,
in relative terms substantive representation has actually been successful. The total amount
of time that there has been a critical mass of women in the legislature is just 10 years.
While critical mass theory suggests a rapid increase in substantive representation, it may
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simply be the case that this process is more gradual than the theory argues. Whether this
slower rate of change is the result of nearly universal factors or contextual ones specific
to some countries is unclear. However, strictly defined party ideologies and high level of
party discipline are certainly limiting factors for women’s substantive representation in
Mexico.

Argentina

Argentina is just five places below Mexico in the World Economic Forum’s
Global Gender Gap Index, ranked 30th while Mexico is 25th.416 With an overall score of
0.746, the gender gaps in the two countries are roughly equal.417 However, country
performance on specific variables is actually quite different. While Mexico and Argentina
receive similar scores for educational attainment and health, their political empowerment
scores vary considerably. Mexico received a 0.468 score for political empowerment in
2020, while Argentina’s was much lower at 0.387.418 The difference is due to the larger
portion of women in the Mexican legislature and the significantly smaller percentage of
women in ministerial positions (42 percent in Mexico and 25 percent in Argentina).419 By
contrast, Argentina’s economic participation score was slightly higher than Mexico’s,
largely due to higher female labor force participation in the former.420 Further, the
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amount of progress made by Argentina since the first publication of the Global Gender
Gap in 2006 has been much less than that made by Mexico. In the years since 2006,
Argentina has moved up just nine spots (from 41st to 30th), while Mexico has progressed
by 50 positions (from 75th to 25th).421 Argentina, of course, began the period of
measurement with a higher level of gender equality than Mexico, and the main difference
between their ranks is due to the fact that the Argentine legislature has yet to achieve
gender parity. These results suggest that overall gender equality is similar in Argentina
and Mexico, with the primary gains for the latter made in terms of descriptive
representation. There is no indication from these statistics of a significant difference in
levels of substantive representation between the two case studies, but, as the remainder of
this chapter will demonstrate, such differences are both prevalent and significant.
Beginning with the legislative venues for women’s substantive representation, it
is apparent that female legislators in Argentina do not have the same formal tools for
collective action as their counterparts in Mexico. Unlike in Mexico, there is no bicameral
institution for female legislators or women’s interests.422 In the Chamber of Deputies,
there is the Family, Women, Childhood, and Adolescence (CFMNA) committee, which is
open to both male and female legislators.423 The Senate has had a Women’s Bench since
2008, which operates much like a Women’s Caucus.424 While the CFMNA and the
Women’s Bench both have review powers, neither has bill introduction powers.425 This
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is, however, typical of legislative committees in Argentina.426 Thus, the CIG has more
legislative weight than either the CFMNA or the Women’s Bench. The policy remits of
these institutions are also distinct. The CIG and Women’s Bench are both women/gender
quality focused in name and in policy scope, and membership in both is restricted to
female legislators.427 The CFMNA is quite different in that women are just a small
portion of the broader policy remit and there is no specific focus on gender quality.
Indeed, the CFMNA reflects a global tendency to lump women and children together, as
‘women-and-children,’ rather to view women’s issues and domestic issues as largely
separate areas that both benefit from gendered perspective policy making. Neither the
CFMNA nor the Women’s Bench truly serve as a focal point for collective action as the
CIG does in Mexico.428
While the broader policy area of the CFMNA and the inclusion of male legislators
in its membership are limiting factors, the similar legislative behavior of the Women’s
Bench – where neither of these issues are apparent – highlights the deeper struggles of
substantive representation in Argentina. Piscopo’s interviews with female legislators in
Argentina reveal that despite the high proportion of women, many continue to fear being
perceived as exclusively or overly interested in the representation of women’s
interests.429 The prevalence of this attitude alone presents a compelling argument that
substantive representation in Argentina is lacking, considering that one of the central
arguments of critical mass theory is that achieving critical mass allows women to move
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beyond the role entrapment and isolation effects that prevent them from acting as
representatives for other women.430
Another challenge to substantive representation in Argentina is the lack of focus
on consensus-building among female legislators. Rather, there is a tendency to operate in
temporary and informal coalitions to sponsor and promote women’s interest
legislation.431 This can be viewed as part of the larger pattern of women’s mobilization in
Argentina that goes back to the introduction of the gender quota and is the result of
perspectives about the role of gender in politics that are fundamentally different from
those held by women in Mexico. Efforts to pass the gender quota for example, were not
generally part of a broader women’s movement but included women from many different
views that agreed almost solely on the quota.432 By contrast, the gender quota movement
in Mexico was part of a larger push for more democratic and inclusive governance that
emphasized gender equality as means of achieving improved governance.433
Additionally, the political networks established by quota advocates in Mexico did not
disappear when the quota law was passed, instead they remained institutionalized both
formally and informally as part of the Mexican political system. In Argentina, the
Network of Feminist Politicians – established in 1990 to mobilize for the quota law –
almost immediately disintegrated after the law was passed.434 Instead of continuing to
build consensus for women’s issues, “members redirected their political action towards
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the interior of their parties in order to guarantee compliance with the Law and to position
themselves within the internal party competition for the spaces that had been opened up
by the quota system.”435 The coalitions supporting the Mexican gender quota advocated
for a number of other reforms and were dedicated to creating lasting soft infrastructure
for women’s collective action in government.436 Whereas women’s interest legislation,
lobbying, and activism in Mexico still place a heavy emphasis on gender mainstreaming
and brining a gendered perspective to all aspects of government, this issue has received
considerably less attention in Argentina.437
The lack of consensus-building and unity in women’s organizations in the
legislature prevent female legislators from acting as a bloc to achieve broader goals such
as gender mainstreaming. However, the emphasis on temporary coalitions that often
involve outside groups and individuals allows female legislators to rally support for
causes that are difficult to address in Mexico, such as reproductive rights.438 Thus,
legislators have achieved substantive representation in the sense that they have been able
to create targeted change on a variety of issues, and have passed significant feminist
legislation in addition to women’s interest legislation, but have not succeeded in some of
the wide ranging reforms that women in Mexico have passed. Abortion laws illustrate
this difference well. In December 2020, federal legislators voted to legalize elective
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abortions for up to 14 weeks of a pregnancy.439 In doing so, Argentina became only the
fourth country in all of Latin America to legalize elective abortions – termination for a
reason other than threat to the mother’s life or rape – after Cuba, Guyana, and
Uruguay.440 Such legislation has been impossible at the federal level in Mexico, largely
because women’s issues are tackled through the CIG, the CIG relies on consensus, and
there is no consensus on abortion in Mexico, nor in many other Latin American
countries.441 Thus, the types of substantive representation in Argentina are different from
that of Mexico, but it would be difficult to argue that one country has a higher degree of
substantive representation than the other simply because of these differences.
Examining legislative behavior among female Deputies, a number of studies show
that women do represent women’s interests in Argentina. Unfortunately, no studies
covering any period of time after 2007 were located. However, women reached critical
mass in 2002 and their representation increased to 40 percent by 2007, so this still allows
for five years of study during which female legislators were 30 percent or more of the
total.442 Htun, Lacalle, and Micozzi conducted a study of all of the bills introduced in
Argentina between 1983 and 2007 with a focus on women’s interest legislation.443 They
included 172,130 bills in the study, of which 3,272 bill (1.8 percent) were coded as
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women’s interest.444 The study found that the correlation between increased
representation of women and the number of women’s interest bills introduced was
positive and highly significant and that the number of women’s interest bills increased at
a greater rate than the overall increase in bills.445 Membership in the CFMNA or
Women’s Bench was also positively correlated with sponsorship of women’s interest
legislation.446
Moreover, this study found that the increased presence of female legislators
influences male bill introduction behavior. With more women in both chambers, male
Deputies and Senators sponsored more women’s interest legislation.447 This last result is,
thus far, the only distinction from studies of legislative behavior in Mexico, which found
that women’s presence did not significantly alter introduction of women’s interest bills
by men.448 Using predictive statistics based on the bill sponsorship data, the study found
that if there are no women in the legislature, individual male Deputies are likely to author
0.5 women’s interest bills per year whereas the lone female Deputy would be likely to
write two women’s interest bill.449 With 30 percent female legislators, each male Deputy
is predicted to sponsor one women’s interest bill each year and each female Deputy is
predicted to sponsor three women’s interests bills.450 Although these results are
predictive, they do reflect the observed trends in women’s interest legislation and its
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sponsors in Argentina. Even if the effects on real individual male Deputies are smaller
than the authors suggest, for example if the increases are driven by several prolific male
Deputies and not a general increase, the endurance and consistency of this trend over
time suggests that shifts in political culture have occurred in Argentina as a result of
women’s higher descriptive representation.
Johnson and Archenti’s study of 1994-2003 reinforces this theory.451 Their study
found that during this period, the percentage of committees in the Chamber of Deputies
with a female President or Vice-President increased substantially. The proportion of
female committee Presidents increased by 23 percentage points and the increase for
female Vice-Presidents was 11 percentage points, so that by 2003, 30 percent of
committees had a female President and 24 percent had a woman as Vice-President.452
This suggests that women in the Chamber of Deputies were very quickly able to gain
access to key leadership and decision-making positions as their descriptive representation
increased. Significantly, this effect has not been limited to legislative seats. While women
continue to be underrepresented in the executive branch, over the past 10 years they have
accounted for 20 to 25 percent of executive cabinet seats – a marked increase from the
zero women in executive cabinets between 1983 and 1995.453 Taken together, these
results show some evidence for both a shift in political climate as it relates to gender and
for the role model effect. However, it should be noted that the gender distribution of
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committee assignments still favors men for more prestigious committees.454 Women are
overrepresented in committees related to women, family, children, and social issues.455
Similarly, they are underrepresented on budgetary and economic committees that have
more political weight and are generally held in higher esteem.456
Johnson and Archenti’s study also looked at the primary issues tackled in
women’s interest legislation, finding that most bills were related to marriage and
maternity (35 percent), some dealt with violence against women (11 percent) and
political rights (8 percent), and relatively few with more controversial issues such as
reproductive rights.457 However, feminist legislation in Argentina has a better track
record than in Mexico, as the country has passed progressive laws on contraception,
sexual education, and abortion that have often been ahead of the curve in Latin
America.458 While the majority of women’s interest legislation introduced in Argentina is
not necessarily feminist legislation, some of it is and some of it has been highly
successful.
Female legislators have the resources to promote substantive representation in
Argentina. The tools and methods that they employ, while often different from their
counterparts in Mexico, have the potential for success. While not all female legislators
work on women’s interest legislation and some do not want to be associated with it, many
women actively promote a variety of causes, including ones that could be called
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progressive or feminist. Most importantly, there is significant evidence that substantive
representation has increased on a number of levels as descriptive representation has risen.
That there is a clear link between the two supports some aspects of critical mass theory,
but the differences in the types of representation seen in Argentina and Mexico show that
the presence of women in legislatures is not the sole factor in substantive representation.
Indeed, the continued collaboration and activism of female legislators and civil society
networks has been critical in ensuring increased substantive representation despite
institutional challenges. In different ways, this organizing can be traced back to the
gender quota movement in each country. Mobilization in support of the gender quota in
Argentina was not driven by consensus and party divides among female legislators were
apparent. The coalitions established for the quota were also not long-lasting, but they
established a pattern of single-issue collaboration within the legislature and with civil
society that has enabled Argentina to achieve a high degree of substantive representation,
especially on feminist issues. Cross-party and civil society women’s networks in Mexico
were born out of the gender quota movement and have lasted to this day, held together
through consensus norms. This has engendered a high degree of substantive
representation in Mexico in regards to broader women’s interests and gender
mainstreaming, while feminist issues remain underrepresented.
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Chapter Five
Substantive Representation Below Critical Mass: Brazil and Chile

This chapter will examine the two case studies in which female legislators have
not reached critical mass: Brazil and Chile. Using similar methods to Chapter Four, the
extent of substantive representation will be evaluated. In doing so, this chapter will
analyze the tools that female legislators have available to them in order to affect
substantive representation, their involvement in women’s interest legislation, and their
effectiveness in promoting women’s interests. Chapter Five will, however, pay greater
attention to outcomes than was demonstrated in Chapter Four. In Argentina and Mexico,
the achievement of critical mass means that the central investigative focus must be on
how critical mass has translated to substantive representation. In the available literature,
this is assessed primarily through the behavior of female legislators and sometimes male
legislators. In the absence of a critical mass of female legislators, it is necessary to not
only examine the behavior of existing female legislators, but also to compare and contrast
the gender equality outcomes that have been achieved in the case studies. In other words,
this chapter asks whether a high degree of substantive representation is possible without
critical mass and it brings in new methodology to answer that question.
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Brazil

Brazil is ranked 92nd in the Global Gender Gap report, and received 0.691 as its
most recent score.459 These values place Brazil well below Argentina and Mexico in
terms of gender equality, but this difference is derived almost entirely from the political
empowerment category. Brazil performs better than Argentina and Mexico in economic
participation and equally as well in education and health.460 Indeed, all that separates
Brazil’s 92nd position from Mexico’s 25th place are the discrepancies in the percentage of
women in the Congress and in ministerial positions.461 These results provide an initial
suggestion that despite low descriptive representative, Brazil has been able to achieve
important gender equality outcomes, hallmarks of successful substantive representation.
Women currently comprise approximately 15 percent of the Brazilian
legislature.462 However, Brazil has had a large, highly active, and diverse feminist
movement since the 1980s.463 Activist networks are complex and enormous and reach the
highest levels of decision-making in the country. One of the most impressive strengths of
substantive representation in Brazil is the high degree of organization and coordination in
and between women’s groups in the legislature and in civil society.464 Like Argentina and
Mexico, Brazil has organizations for women’s issues in the legislature. There is no bicameral organization; however, the Chamber of Deputies has the Women’s Caucus and
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the Senate has the Women’s Bench. The Women’s Secretariat was founded in 2013 to
combine the previously existing women’s bench, often called Bancada do Batom or
Lipstick Lobby,465 and the Women’s Prosecutor’s Office, created in 2009.466 Although
the Women’s Secretariat occasionally deals with issues relating to family and children, its
primary mandate is women’s issues and its historical roots are in the Brazilian feminist
movement.467 Despite lacking some of the powers that women’s legislative groups
possess in Argentina and Mexico, the Women’s Secretariat has made impressive gains.
The formal powers of the Women’s Secretariat include legislative monitoring,
and receiving and providing legal advice on complaints related to sexual and domestic
violence.468 Critically, the organization serves as a kind of clearinghouse for women’s
issues at the federal level and works closely with the National Council of Women’s
Rights and the Special National Secretariat for Women’s Policies, a ministerial body.469
The collaboration between female legislators who, at the time, did not have a women’s
caucus and the National Council of Women’s Rights was crucial for the progressive
achievements of Brazil’s 1988 Constitution.470 Such achievements included enumerating
the equality of men and women under the law, obligating the state to prevent domestic
violence, and mandating 120 days of paid maternity leave.471
Perhaps most importantly, the Women’s Secretariat is closely involved with a
number of non-governmental women’s organizations, including the Center for Feminist

465

Htun, “Puzzles of Women’s Rights in Brazil,” 736.
Portal da Câmara dos Deputados. “Secretaria Da Mulher.” Accessed March 18, 2021.
https://www2.camara.leg.br/a-camara/estruturaadm/secretarias/secretaria-da-mulher.
467
Htun, “Puzzles of Women’s Rights in Brazil,” 736.
468
Portal da Câmara dos Deputados. “Secretaria Da Mulher.”
469
Htun, “Puzzles of Women’s Rights in Brazil,” 738.
470
Ibid, 737.
471
Ibid.
466

102

Studies and Advisory Services, which was founded in 1988 to assist lawmakers in
drafting and passing progressive women’s interest legislation.472 Furthermore, although
these coalitions change as civil society organizations grow, decline, or shift, the overall
pattern of collaboration is enduring. The Women’s Secretariat has worked closely with
the Center for Feminist Studies since the 1980s and continues to do so today.473 In the
Senate, the Women’s Bench, founded in 1998, operates very similarly.474 It works on
projects relating to women’s health, employment, and involvement in politics in addition
to prevention of violence against women and housing a Special Prosecutor’s Office for
Women.475 The functions and methods of the women’s legislative organizations are thus
distinct from those in Argentina and Mexico. In Brazil, female legislators pursue feminist
legislation that would push the boundaries of what is acceptable in Mexico’s CIG.476
Furthermore, while legislators in Argentina are advocating similarly progressive policies,
they do so in ad-hoc coalitions that do not resemble the strong network of advocacy
present in Brazil. Women in the Brazilian Congress have a plethora of formal and
informal tools available to them to advance women’s representation and equality and
many are willing to use them.477 To characterize the general nature of women’s
organization within the Brazilian Congress, it falls somewhere between the overly
consensus-driven system in Mexico and the temporary and insecure networks of
organization in Argentina.
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Having established that many of the tools needed for substantive representation
through collaboration do indeed exist and function well in Brazil, the next piece to
analyze is legislative behavior. One important distinction between Argentina and Mexico
in Chapter Four and Brazil and Chile in this chapter is the closed list versus open list
voting system. Scholars have suggested that closed list systems are predicated on voter
support for party platforms and not as much on the experience, past performance, and
policies of individual candidates.478 In an open list system, where voters can rank their
candidate choices, candidates may feel a greater need to target specific constituencies and
to act in office in ways that attract these constituencies. Essentially, legislators, once in
office, may feel a pressure to work towards the specific needs of their constituents rather
than simply toeing the party line. In this sense, one might expect female legislators in
open list systems to be more actively committed to women’s issues in office, if women
are a key constituency, than female legislators in closed list systems.479 Unfortunately,
similar data on bill sponsorship and introduction as those presented in the previous
chapter were not located for Brazil. This is likely because the majority of bills that pass in
Brazil, approximately 75 percent, originate from the executive branch.480 However, data
concerning the prominence of female legislators, the prevalence of women in appointed
positions, discourses in the Chamber of Deputies, and survey responses are available to
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assist in determining whether and how female legislators represent women and what
barriers are present.
Female legislators in Brazil possess less political clout, occupy fewer leadership
positions, and are less likely to be involved in ‘hard politics’ than their male counterparts.
In Brazil’s case, the Interunion Department of Parliamentary Aides provides useful data
on the political power of legislators.481 Each year, a list is compiled of the “Best 100
Heads in National Congress,” based on legislator’s formal positions, decision-making
power, and reputation with others.482 One analysis of this list found that between 1994
and 2009, the number of women considered among the top 100 most influential members
of Congress never rose beyond six and averaged just under five.483 In other words, among
the most powerful members of the Brazilian Congress, typically just five percent of them
are women. This underrepresentation is due to a number of factors; dismissals of
women’s lack of influence as the result of inexperience are not fully accurate. Indeed, one
of the main issues explaining the lower political standing of many female legislators is
their formal relegation to ‘soft’ committees and informal expectation to focus on social
issues rather than high prestige projects with high economic and political impact.484 An
analysis of 1999 to 2006 found that 86 percent of women served on ‘soft’ committees
while just 55 percent of men did the same.485 In high prestige committees, 75 percent of
men participated compared to 47 percent of women.486 The same is true of ministerial
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positions, where women are extremely underrepresented, especially in high status
ministries.487 The current Brazilian cabinet is just nine percent women, which is not an
uncommonly low number for the country.488 Even under a female President, Dilma
Roussef, women held just two of the ten ministerial posts considered to be politically and
economically important.489
These results suggest two things. First, female legislators in Brazil have not
escaped the tokenization and role entrapment observed by Kanter in the absence of
critical mass.490 Female legislators are pressured to focus on social issues, of which
women’s interests are a large part, but work on these issues is considered less important
than other legislative priorities and prevents women from accumulating political clout.491
This creates a cycle in which female legislators work hard to promote women’s issues
but, partially as a result of that work, are unable to move up the proverbial legislative
ladder and gain the power that might facilitate broader and deeper policy change for
women. However, these results are not substantively different from what has been
observed in Argentina and Mexico. Although in those countries women have made more
progress in accessing leadership and cabinet positions, including those on traditionally
‘masculine’ topics, this has only occurred very recently. Second, the continued low
presence of women in ministry and cabinet posts, as well as in the judicial branch,
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demonstrates that there has not been a role-model effect in Brazil as a result of the quota.
This, too, is largely consistent with findings from Argentina and Mexico which, while
slightly more encouraging, generally do not support the existence of a role-model effect.
In terms of data on bills, the available results do not speak specifically to
women’s interest legislation, but rather to the overall success of female legislators.
Estimates place the passage rate of bills introduced by female legislators between 1.5
percent and 4.5 percent, compared to five to seven percent for both genders.492
Furthermore, 19 percent of the bills passed by women in the study were for largely
superficial projects, such as naming institutions or creating commemorative dates.493 For
both genders, this figure was just 3.8 percent.494 These statistics demonstrate that female
legislators have more difficulty passing legislation and that when they do pass legislation
it is much more likely to relatively unimportant. In a broader sense, this shows that
female legislators face additional barriers in law-making compared to their male
counterparts. This provides evidence of persistent discrimination within the Congress and
suggests a major impediment for the substantive representation of women.
In the absence of data on women’s interest bill sponsorship and introduction,
another way of examining legislators’ commitment to women’s interests is through
speeches and parliamentary discussion. In plenary debates, issues of ‘hard politics’ are
the central focus, reinforcing their primacy in the Congress in general.495 Male legislators
are more likely to speak on these issues, a difference of six percentage points.496
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However, women are more 16 percentage points likely to discuss ‘soft politics,’ which
nearly evens the total number of speeches given by each gender.497 Incumbency may
contribute to this disparity. The same study found a steep decline in the number of
speeches on ‘soft politics’ from first term legislators to third term legislators.498 Turning
to content about women’s issues, female legislators are nearly twice as likely to discuss
abortion than their male colleagues, although the topic is not heavily discussed due to
stigma.499 Analysis of the speeches made on International Women’s Day between 1975
and 2006 provide some further insight. Women were also twice as likely to speak about
women and women’s issues on this day compared to men.500 Female legislators also used
the occasion to raise legitimate policy issues relating to women much more frequently
than their male counterparts.501 While the majority of speeches given by male legislators
were ritual, depoliticized, or historical in nature, 86 percent of speeches made by female
legislators made real critiques of gender issues or were focused on serious policy
changes.502 While narrow in scope, these statistics do provide some evidence that female
legislators in Brazil are concerned with women’s issues and that this concern is both
more frequent and more substantive than that generally demonstrated by male colleagues.
This is consistent with research from Argentina and Mexico showing that female
legislators are, on average, more willing to represent women’s interests than their male
counterparts.
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Data from the Center for Feminist Studies and Advisory Services (CFEMEA)
provides more recent information about the policy perspectives of male and female
legislators in regards to women’s rights.503 The 2019 version of the CFEMEA’s report on
Women’s Resistance in the National Congress notes that of the 77 women in the
Congress, 20 identify openly as feminists.504 CFEMEA’s data also sheds light on the
success of collaborations between female legislators and non-governmental organizations
in Brazil. In 2019 alone, CFEMEA monitored 230 proposals for bills pertaining to
women’s rights and access to services.505 In the same year, 75 of these bills were
presented in the Chamber of Deputies.506 The report remarks that this is a marked
increase from previous years; however, many of the bills, especially those concerning
reproductive rights and abortion, sought to, from a feminist perspective, restrict women’s
rights.507 Thus, women’s issues are being deliberated and addressed extensively in the
Brazilian Congress, but not always in keeping with Western feminist orthodoxy.
A survey conducted by CFEMEA between 2007 and 2010 gathered results about
views on women’s issues from 321 legislators.508 Eight percent of respondents were
women and 92 percent were men.509 The majority of the respondents were from the
center or center-left, 62 percent for men and 45 percent for women.510 Another 41 percent
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of women were from the left. The low percentage of respondents from the right (nine
percent for men and eight percent for women) certainly skews the results, but the data is
still useful for evaluating the difference in viewpoints between male and female
legislators. Selected results from the report, translated using Google Translate, are
summarized in a table below.
Table 1: Brazilian Legislator Survey Results: Women’s Rights 2007-2010511
Statement/Policy

Position

Both
Genders

Women

Men

Political parties should be
punished for non-compliance
with the gender quota
Placement mandates should
be implemented for candidate
lists
Parties should devote 30% of
candidate funds to female
candidates
Regulated 1 month paternity
leave

Agree or somewhat agree 37
85
32
Disagree or somewhat
62
15
67
disagree
Agree or somewhat agree 25
67
21
Disagree or somewhat
73
33
76
disagree
Agree or somewhat agree 64
89
61
Disagree or somewhat
35
7
37
disagree
Agree or somewhat agree 39
Disagree or somewhat
59
disagree
Extend maternity leave to 6
Agree or somewhat agree 51
months
Disagree or somewhat
46
disagree
Allow abortion if serious risk Agree or somewhat agree 89
to mother’s health
Disagree or somewhat
9
disagree
Allow abortion at 12 weeks
Agree or somewhat agree 23
(no other conditions)
Disagree or somewhat
72
disagree
Allow abortion at 20 weeks
Agree or somewhat agree 61
in cases of rape
Disagree or somewhat
35
disagree
*Non-responses and ‘Do not know’ responses are not included in this table.
**Gender disaggregated data is presented as given in the cited report. Some questions did not report gender
disaggregated data.
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There are several key takeaways from the data presented in Table 1. The
responses to questions about the gender quota demonstrate a concerning lack of support
for the quota law in among men. In particular, the limited agreement among men for
punishments for non-compliance and enforcement of placement mandates suggests that
male legislators would prefer the quota be loose and, perhaps, ineffectual. Given the low
proportion of women in the legislature even after the quota, this implies that many male
legislators prefer or are satisfied with the underrepresentation of women. The opposition
from male legislators to increased descriptive representation for women has several
important implications for substantive representation. It suggests that male legislators do
not understand the importance of female representation or are unwilling to sacrifice
candidate spots in order to increase women’s presence in the legislature. This bodes
poorly for women eventually reaching critical mass in Brazil. If part of their reluctance to
support effective quota measures comes from gender bias or a lack of value placed of
women’s issues, this indicates significant barriers for female legislators in enacting
substantive representation without critical mass. Further, it may suggest that the
opposition from male legislators goes deeper than placement mandates and enforcement
mechanisms; some men may reject the quota entirely. This perspective would seriously
jeopardize opportunities for female legislators to represent women in office or, for that
matter, to represent anyone effectively if their male counterparts believe they have gained
their position ‘illegitimately,’
Unfortunately, gender disaggregated results were not available for the questions
on abortion and parental leave. However, because 92 percent of the respondents were
men the data provides considerable insight about the perspective of male legislators even
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without disaggregation.512 The relatively high support for extended maternal leave
suggests that legislators in general, and men in particular, do consider women’s labor
rights important. The support for paternal leave seems to imply that legislators
understand the relevance of gendered division of domestic labor, even if they do not
directly consider paternal leave a women’s rights issue. Responses to the questions on
abortion mostly reflect satisfaction with the current laws on abortion, as well as the
continued public sentiment against legalized abortion without extenuating circumstances.
This data demonstrates limited progress on some women’s issues, divisions between male
and female legislators in regards to women’s political representation, and continued
resistance to some feminist policies.
Ultimately, the perspectives reflected in Table 1 suggest that female legislators
face significant barriers in enacting effective substantive representation and that their
presence has not engendered a broader cultural shift in the legislature. The efficacy of the
Women’s Secretariat and the deep and persistent collaboration between female legislators
and civil society actors in encouraging.513 Furthermore, outcomes for women in health,
education, and especially employment in Brazil demonstrate that gender equality is being
addressed on a number of fronts even with the low proportion of women in the
legislature.514 However, much of this progress has been due to the tireless efforts of civil
society organizations and public movements.515 Female legislators in Brazil struggle to
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attain political clout and prestige and face gender bias within the legislature.516 Many of
these problems reflect those apparent in Argentina and Mexico, yet more progress has
been made regarding substantive representation in those countries than in Brazil.

Chile

In 2020, Chile ranked 57th in the Global Gender Gap Report, scoring an overall
total of 0.723.517 This score places Chile just slightly below Argentina, which scored
0.746.518 The difference in their scores comes almost entirely from the political
empowerment category. Chile, Argentina, and Mexico rank roughly the same in the three
other categories.519 Observing the pattern with all four case studies, it seems that in many
measurable outcomes of gender equality there is little substantive difference other than
the proportion of women in government. Data on bill introduction and voting behavior on
women’s interests bills in the legislature was not located for this case study. The recent
introduction of the gender quota limits the overall amount of available literature on this
topic and the ‘presidentialist’ nature of legislation in Chile would challenge the
usefulness of this data if it was available. Instead, this section devotes greater attention to
the relationships between formal and informal institutions and norms and substantive
representation.
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Chile is an intriguing case study of women’s substantive representation. The
gender quota has only been in place a few short years and the proportion of women
remains below critical mass at 22.6 percent.520 Much of the progress the country has
made on women’s issues took place under the two terms of a female President, Michelle
Bachelet from 2006 to 2010 and from 2015 to 2018. Furthermore, Chile has several
distinct formal and informal facets of governance that influence both the descriptive and
substantive representation. The country is often characterized as ‘presidentialist,’
meaning that a great deal of power, including legislative power, rests within the
Executive Branch.521 Despite this, governance is often informally regulating by
consensus norms.522 This is rooted partially in the fact that politics is dominated by
coalitions rather than one or two parties at a time, as in Argentina.523 However, although
parties typically must form coalitions to govern, they are each stable and ideologically
well-defined, as in Mexico.524 This creates a system in which the President has
considerable legislative power, but often prioritizes consensus in policy-making in a
political system dominated by coalitions of strong and well-defined political parties.
Among these parties, the socially conservative Christian Democrats typically features in
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the ruling coalition.525 These characteristics of governance in Chile present numerous
potential implications for the substantive representation of women.
The legislative power of the Executive, which is similar in many ways to
Brazil,526 means that women’s interest legislation is, like nearly all other legislation,
largely dependent on Presidential support.527 Thus, the political party, identity, and values
of each President greatly affect the progress, or stalling, of women’s rights and gender
equality. This can work both for and against substantive representation in terms of gender
equality outcomes through legislation, but the larger influence of the Executive Branch
necessarily means that less power rests in the legislature and, thus, female legislators
have less power with which to enact substantive representation. In Chile as in Mexico,
consensus norms are important. However, these norms apply to governance in general in
Chile, as opposed to specifically to women’s organizations in Mexico.528 Additionally,
the presence of strong, socially conservative parties is not limited to the right in Chile.
The Christian Democrats are often a leading force in center and center-left coalitions,
meaning that political opposition to some feminist policies is common among right,
center-right, center, and center-left governments.529 This is not unique in Latin America,
but the prominence of the Christian Democrats due to the party’s leading role in steering
the country into democratization does lend the party a special place in Chilean politics.530
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Chile has the weakest formal organization of female legislators of the four case
studies. While the Senate has no organization of any kind, the Chamber of Deputies does
have a Women’s Caucus.531 However, the Women’s Caucus is informal, meaning that it
does not have any official powers and there are no formal rules governing the body.532
The Women’s Caucus further lacks both a communication plan and a strategic plan.533
The organization’s main focus is gender equality, rather than something more broad such
as women, children, and family. It is open to male and female legislators of all parties.534
However, despite the informality of the Women’s Caucus, the Chamber of Deputies does
have a formal Commission on Women and Gender Equality.535 This Commission has 16
members, all women, and authors a handful of bills and reports each year.536 Notably, it
has sponsored a number of feminist bills in the last five years. In 2018, the Commission
authored an unsuccessful bill to decriminalize abortion without conditions until 14
weeks.537 The bill was revived this year, around the same time that Argentina legalized
abortion, and will be voted on in April.538 In the same year, the Commission introduced a
bill requiring political parties to implement protocols for the prevention and punishment
of sexual harassment.539 In 2021, the organization authored a bill that would provide
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protection and reparations to the families of femicide victims.540 The Commission on
Women and Gender Equality is smaller and has less formal power than the CIG in
Mexico, for example. Although the body does not produce a large quantity of legislation,
it is clearly willing to sponsor progressive, feminist bills. However, opportunities for
substantive women’s collaboration within the legislature are limited.
Chile has in recent years created a number of other governmental bodies outside
the legislature that deal with women’s interests, some of which are prominent and wellfunded. Immediately after the democratic transition in 1990, the government created a
women’s policy agency called Servicio Nacional de la Mujer (SERNAM).541 The
creation of SERNAM was tied to the activism of a group called the Coalition of Women
for Democracy, and quickly resulted in the establishment of a highly successful national
Plan for Equal Opportunity of Women.542 This echoed the establishment of important
women’s organizations in government that took place in Argentina and Mexico; this
repetitive narrative reinforces the primacy of women’s activism in achieving substantive
change. In 2015, SERNAM was upgraded to a Ministry for Women, which enjoys a great
deal of funding, resources, and policy influence.543 The work of these organizations, with
considerable support from President Bachelet in her second term, has resulted in a
number of progressive, feminist policies in Chile, including universal day-care for lowincome families, access to contraception for all women and girls 14 and older, and the
expansion of laws on violence against women and domestic violence.544
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However, it is important to note that Chile does not have the same history of
solidarity among female legislators as Argentina and Mexico. The establishment of the
quota law in each country is a prime example of this, but the same pattern extends to
other divisive issues. Whereas women in Mexico were able to overcome strict party
ideologies to support the quota through organization, collaboration, and consensus and
women in Argentina were able to form coalitions to push through the quota, female
legislators in Chile were deeply divided on the quota. In a 2008 survey, just 49 percent of
women in the coalition on the right, Alianza, expressed support for a gender quota.545
Htun cites an interview she conducted with a female legislator from Alianza in 2012 to
explain how partisan divisions among women extend to other issues, summarizing the
interviewee’s remarks as follows: “whereas they could find common ground on women’s
access to work and the problem of violence, they would continue to disagree on abortion
and on quotas.”546 These remarks indicate that female legislators are committed to
promoting substantive representation on issues where consensus is available, such as
equality under the law, labor and employment, education, health, and violence against
women. However, on more divisive issues female legislators do not act as a unified
group, and this is not the case for just a few hardline Deputies or Senators but for a large
portion of women. Furthermore, the division seems to be the result of deeply entrenched
features of party politics rather than the lack of critical mass. The gender quota ultimately
passed because of the incredible support President Bachelet placed behind it, indicating
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once more that the executive is often the final arbiter of gender issues, and most other
issues, in Chile.547
When discussing substantive representation in Chile, it is important to recognize
that while women are not well-represented in the legislature, they have done better in
appointed positions than their counterparts in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. Since 1990,
women have comprised an average of 29 percent of each administration’s initial
Executive Cabinet; since 2000 this number has been 37 percent.548 Currently, women
represent 33 percent of the Cabinet.549 This is a marked different to the low presence of
women in appointed positions in Mexico (until President Loprez Obrador) and Brazil,
and it is slightly above the representation in Argentina which has typically been 20 to 25
percent in the past decade.550
Franceschet neatly sums up the case of women’s substantive representation in
Chile by boiling it down to three key facets.551 First, although women have not reached
critical mass in the Chilean legislature, they are highly active on women’s issues and
have the support of the influential Ministry for Women (formerly SERNAM) behind
them.552 Second, consensus-building norms and clearly defined partisan ideology
influence all policy-making, including on gender issues, and this can both help and hinder
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women’s interest legislation depending on the specific topic addressed.553 Third, the
presidentialist nature of the political system means that outcomes on gender issues are
often ultimately determined by the President and the executive, sometimes regardless of
the efforts of legislators.554 Chile is thus well-positioned to make great strides on
women’s issues when supported by the President and to ‘weather the storm’ with
continued progress on non-controversial issues through the Ministry for Women when
without executive support.555 Female legislators are largely willing to work on women’s
interest legislation and do so, in part, through the Commission on Women and Gender
Equality.556 However, this work is marked by partisan divides. Consensus norms are not
prioritized within women’s groups, but instead refer to the need for consensus between
the legislature and the executive. Despite this, the high proportion of women in executive
cabinets over the last two decades is a highly encouraging sign for women’s substantive
representation given the enormous influence of the executive.557
Taking all of this into account, the degree of substantive representation for
women in Chile is not high. In comparison to the other case studies, Chile seems to lag
behind Argentina and Mexico, although each country has areas in which substantive
representation is stronger and weaker than the other case studies. All three countries are
ahead of Brazil in both substantive and descriptive representation. The first chapter of
this paper defined substantive representation as a measure of the position and agency of
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women within legislative bodies and their power and will to represent women’s interests.
The vast majority of progress on gender equality in Chile has taken place under a female
president who has, at times, gone to great lengths to ensure that both feminist and
women’s interest measures are implemented.558 Female legislators, while making great
strides on some issues, are often divided and the institutional tools, both formal and
informal, at their disposal are weak compared to those in the other case studies.559 In
Chile, as in Argentina, connections between civil society groups and female legislators do
not feature heavily in legislation on women’s issues.560 However, the general trajectory of
both descriptive and substantive representation for women has been positive. The
legislative activity of the Commission on Women and Gender Equality in recent years
illustrates this point.561 Furthermore, women in the executive, including in the cabinet
and ministries, are enacting substantive representation in Chile.562 This raises questions
about placing the locus of research on substantive representation on legislative bodies
when clearly other parts of government can conduct similar work.
In both Brazil and Chile, there were no strong activism networks supporting the
adoption and implementation of gender quotas. However, civil society organizations are
important sources of substantive representation in both countries. Indeed, the connections
between non-governmental institutions and female legislators are crucial in both
countries for women’s interest issues and legislation. The lack of political clout of female
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legislators in both countries and the signs of continued tokenization suggest that lower
descriptive representation is hindering substantive representation. However, women have
forged networks and connections to continue working to represent women’s interests
nonetheless.
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Conclusion

This paper analyzed gender quotas and their descriptive and substantive effects in
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico to answer the question: To what extent and in what
ways does women’s collaboration influence the relationship between the descriptive and
substantive representation of women in the context of legislated candidate gender quotas?
The findings of this paper support the hypothesis. Women’s collaboration within the
legislature and between the legislature and civil society is a critical and overlooked
variable in defining the relationship between descriptive and substantive representation.
Specifically, cross-party collaboration among legislators and with women’s civil society
groups resulted in more effective articulation of women’s interest and feminist goals.
Networks of women in civil society and women in the legislature that were founded
during the gender quota movement and persisted afterwards are associated with higher
substantive representation. In Mexico and Argentina, patterns of collaboration were
defined during the movement for gender quotas and have endured to this day. In Brazil
and Chile, collaboration has been lower and no movement for gender quotas was ever
active.
In Mexico, high descriptive representation has not led to full substantive
representation, particularly in regards to feminist issues. The same has occurred in
Argentina, although there feminist issues have received more attention and representation
of broader women’s interest and gender mainstreaming has been less effective. In Brazil
and Chile, women enjoy a relatively high degree of substantive representation, albeit
lower than in Argentina and Mexico, despite low descriptive representation. This paper
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found that these discrepancies can be explained, in large part, by the collaboration and
consensus patterns and norms among female legislators and women’s civil society
groups. This conclusion adds to the current understanding of the impact of gender quotas
by identifying women and women’s organizations as critical actors. More importantly, it
suggests that an increased focus on when, how, and why women mobilize is needed in
order to fully understand the degrees of descriptive and substantive representation that
arise from gender quotas.
This finding could be explored in future research to study the methods of
mobilization that are most effective and the degree of institutionalization of women’s
networks necessary to ensure lasting high descriptive and substantive representation. It is
also worth considering whether this mobilization must occur on a grass-roots level, as in
the case studies, or whether it could be engineered through forums and existing women’s
organizations in other countries. This is an important consideration for public policy. It is
clear that in countries where gender quota adoption or reform is being debated, women
must be involved in the discussion and given the opportunity to organize collectively.
The best format of that debate and organization, however, remains unclear. It is also
important to recognize that this paper did not explore the dynamics of race, ethnicity, or
class in gender quotas and their effects. However, these are, of course, significant issues
that remain understudied in research on gender quotas. Future research should work to
identify the most effective forms of mobilization to ensure that gender quotas promote
substantive representation of all women.
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